title = {arm: Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/ Hierarchical Modelsm, arm: Dataanalysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical models (R package version 1.4--13)},
year = {2011}}
@article{Knol_etal2011,
author = {Knol, Mirjam},
date-added = {2022-01-31 10:41:43 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-31 10:43:56 -0600},
journal = {PLoS One},
title = {Potential Misinterpretation of Treatment Effects Due to Use of Odds Ratios and Logistic Regression in Randomized Controlled Trials},
year = {2011}}
@article{SamiiAronow2012,
author = {Samii, Cyrus, and Peter M Aronow},
date-added = {2022-01-31 10:39:24 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-31 10:39:59 -0600},
journal = {Statistics and Probability Letters},
title = {On Equivalencies Between Design-Based and Regression-Based Variance Estimators for Randomized Experiments},
year = {2012}}
@article{AustinStuart2015,
author = {Peter C Austin, and Elizabeth A Stuart},
date-added = {2022-01-27 13:43:11 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-27 13:44:02 -0600},
journal = {Statistical Methods in Medical Research},
title = {Estimating the effect of treatment on binary outcomes using full matching on the propensity score},
year = {2015}}
@article{StuartGreen2008,
author = {Stuart EA, and Green KM},
date-added = {2022-01-20 23:13:53 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-20 23:15:04 -0600},
journal = {Developmental Psychology},
title = {Using full matching to estimate causal effects in nonexperimental studies: Examining the relationship between adolescent marijuana use and adult outcomes},
year = {2008}}
@article{GreenStuart2014,
author = {Kerry M. Green, and Elizabeth A. Stuart},
date-added = {2022-01-20 22:57:28 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-20 22:59:22 -0600},
journal = {Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology},
title = {Examining Moderation Analyses in Propensity Score Methods: Application to Depression and Substance Use},
year = {2014}}
@article{EckHultman2007,
author = {Eck, Kristine & Lisa Hultman},
date-added = {2022-01-20 20:59:22 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-20 21:01:34 -0600},
journal = {Journal of Peace Research},
number = {2},
title = {Violence Against Civilians in War.},
volume = {44},
year = {2007}}
@webpage{CohenRagnhild2014,
author = {Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nord{\aa}s},
date-added = {2022-01-20 20:57:07 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-20 20:58:32 -0600},
title = {Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset},
title = {The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy},
volume = {32},
year = {2010}}
@article{Akhavan2009,
author = {Akhavan, Payam},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
doi = {10.1353/hrq.0.0096},
file = {Akhavan - 2009 - Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentiv.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/DM53UMXF/Akhavan - 2009 - Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentiv.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {1085-794X},
journal = {Human Rights Quarterly},
keywords = {amnesty},
language = {en},
number = {3},
pages = {624--654},
shorttitle = {Are {International} {Criminal} {Tribunals} a {Disincentive} to {Peace}?},
title = {Are {International} {Criminal} {Tribunals} a {Disincentive} to {Peace}?: {Reconciling} {Judicial} {Romanticism} with {Political} {Realism}},
note = {Ban Ki-moon, remark at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (27 May 2010)}}
@book{Bosco2014,
author = {David Bosco},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
keywords = {method; amnesty},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
title = {Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics},
year = {2014}}
@article{Chaudoin2016,
author = {Chaudoin, Stephen},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
doi = {10.1086/684595},
file = {Chaudoin - 2016 - How Contestation Moderates the Effects of Internat.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/EZJSSUU4/Chaudoin - 2016 - How Contestation Moderates the Effects of Internat.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {0022-3816, 1468-2508},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
keywords = {amnesty},
language = {en},
month = apr,
number = {2},
pages = {557--571},
shorttitle = {How {Contestation} {Moderates} the {Effects} of {International} {Institutions}},
title = {How {Contestation} {Moderates} the {Effects} of {International} {Institutions}: {The} {International} {Criminal} {Court} and {Kenya}},
title = {Preventing Civil War: How the Potential for International Intervention can Deter Conflict Onset},
year = {2016}}
@article{Dai2005,
author = {Xinyuan Dai},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
journal = {International Organization},
keywords = {amnesty},
title = {Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism},
year = {2005}}
@article{Dancy2018,
abstract = {Do legal amnesties for combatants help end civil wars? International policy experts often take it for granted that amnesties promote negotiated settlements with rebels. However, a large number of amnesties are followed by continued fighting or a return to the battlefield. What, then, are the factors that make amnesties effective or ineffective? In this article I use a disaggregated data set of all amnesties enacted in the context of internal war since 1946 to evaluate a bargaining theory of amnesties and peace. Testing hypotheses about conflict patterns using models that account for selection, I find that (1) only amnesties passed following conflict termination help resolve civil wars, (2) amnesties are more effective when they are embedded in peace agreements, and (3) amnesties that grant immunity for serious rights violations have no observable pacifying effects. These policy-relevant findings represent a new breakthrough in an ossified ``peace versus justice'' debate pitting security specialists against global human rights advocates.},
author = {Dancy, Geoff},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
doi = {10.1017/S0020818318000012},
file = {Dancy - 2018 - Deals with the Devil Conflict Amnesties, Civil Wa.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/PSUPMAMV/Dancy - 2018 - Deals with the Devil Conflict Amnesties, Civil Wa.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {0020-8183, 1531-5088},
journal = {International Organization},
keywords = {amnesty},
language = {en},
number = {2},
pages = {387--421},
shorttitle = {Deals with the {Devil}?},
title = {Deals with the {Devil}? {Conflict} {Amnesties}, {Civil} {War}, and {Sustainable} {Peace}},
abstract = {In the difficult process of ending civil wars, granting amnesty during conflict is seen as a useful option, with an underpinning assumption that trading justice for peace is effective. However, is the case? This article tries to bring some clarity to when and how amnesty given during conflict has an impact. Amnesty should have different effects on diverse conflict endings: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or conflict reduction. The article also disaggregates amnesties to test direct impacts as an incentive or through reducing the commitment problem, and indirect effects that give military advantage to the government. Using a crossnational data set of amnesties in dyadic conflicts from 1975 to 2011, the research finds that amnesty's strongest effect is, surprisingly, not as an incentive but rather to reduce commitment problems. It can lead to negotiated settlements but also to government military advantage. The results have implications for negotiations and conflict resolution.},
author = {Daniels, Lesley-Ann},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
doi = {10.1177/0022002720909884},
file = {Daniels - 2020 - How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Confl.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/CJ2QM543/Daniels - 2020 - How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Confl.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {0022-0027, 1552-8766},
journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
keywords = {amnesty},
language = {en},
month = oct,
number = {9},
pages = {1612--1637},
title = {How and {When} {Amnesty} during {Conflict} {Affects} {Conflict} {Termination}},
abstract = {In recent years, several oppressive leaders have been arrested and extradited to international courts. What are the consequences of this global justice cascade? I address this question by examining patterns of exile. I show that the justice cascade has a differential effect on leaders based on their culpability (whether they presided over atrocity crimes). In the past, culpable and nonculpable leaders went into exile at virtually identical rates. Today, however, culpable leaders are about six times less likely to flee abroad because exile no longer guarantees a safe retirement. These findings raise stark implications for existing research that debates whether international justice deters atrocities or prolongs conflicts. My results about exiled leaders, I explain, imply that the justice cascade should deter atrocities and prolong conflicts. Thus, instead of debating whether international justice is helpful or harmful, future scholarship should carefully consider the trade-offs it creates.},
author = {Krcmaric, Daniel},
copyright = {{\copyright}2018, Midwest Political Science Association},
booktitle = {Amnesty in the {Age} of {Human} {Rights} {Accountability}},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
editor = {Lessa, Francesca and Payne, Leigh A.},
file = {Mallinder - 2012 - Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability .pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/RHR26RD8/Mallinder - 2012 - Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability .pdf:application/pdf},
isbn = {978-1-139-17715-3},
keywords = {amnesty},
language = {en},
pages = {69--96},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {Amnesties' {Challenge} to the {Global} {Accountability} {Norm}?},
urldate = {2021-05-12},
year = {2012}}
@article{McGillivrayAlastair2000,
author = {McGillivray, Fiona, and Alastair Smith.},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
journal = {International Organization},
keywords = {amnesty},
title = {Trust and cooperation through agent specific punishments},
year = {2000}}
@article{Peskin2005,
author = {Peskin, Victor},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
journal = {Journal of Human Rights},
keywords = {amnesty},
title = {Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda},
volume = {4.2},
year = {2005}}
@article{Prorok2017,
author = {Prorok, Alyssa K},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
journal = {International Organization},
keywords = {amnesty},
title = {The (In)Compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil Conflict Termination},
note = {Freeman and Pensky (Ch 2of Lessa and Payne 2012) cited Slye's statement borrowing Mallinder's citation which I could not find the original text.}}
@article{SnyderVinjamuri2003,
author = {Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri},
date-added = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
date-modified = {2022-01-12 11:32:02 -0600},
journal = {International Security},
keywords = {amnesty},
number = {3},
pages = {5-44},
title = {Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice},
volume = {28},
year = {2003}}
@article{Luhrmann_etal2021,
author = {L{\"u}hrmann, Anna, Marcus Tannenberg, & Staffan I. Lindberg},
date-added = {2021-05-21 09:36:55 +0900},
date-modified = {2021-05-21 09:39:17 +0900},
journal = {Politics and Governance [Online]},
title = {Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes},
title = {Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda},
file = {Akhavan - 2009 - Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentiv.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/DM53UMXF/Akhavan - 2009 - Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentiv.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {1085-794X},
journal = {Human Rights Quarterly},
language = {en},
number = {3},
pages = {624--654},
shorttitle = {Are {International} {Criminal} {Tribunals} a {Disincentive} to {Peace}?},
title = {Are {International} {Criminal} {Tribunals} a {Disincentive} to {Peace}?: {Reconciling} {Judicial} {Romanticism} with {Political} {Realism}},
file = {Chaudoin - 2016 - How Contestation Moderates the Effects of Internat.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/EZJSSUU4/Chaudoin - 2016 - How Contestation Moderates the Effects of Internat.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {0022-3816, 1468-2508},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
language = {en},
month = apr,
number = {2},
pages = {557--571},
shorttitle = {How {Contestation} {Moderates} the {Effects} of {International} {Institutions}},
title = {How {Contestation} {Moderates} the {Effects} of {International} {Institutions}: {The} {International} {Criminal} {Court} and {Kenya}},
abstract = {Do legal amnesties for combatants help end civil wars? International policy experts often take it for granted that amnesties promote negotiated settlements with rebels. However, a large number of amnesties are followed by continued fighting or a return to the battlefield. What, then, are the factors that make amnesties effective or ineffective? In this article I use a disaggregated data set of all amnesties enacted in the context of internal war since 1946 to evaluate a bargaining theory of amnesties and peace. Testing hypotheses about conflict patterns using models that account for selection, I find that (1) only amnesties passed following conflict termination help resolve civil wars, (2) amnesties are more effective when they are embedded in peace agreements, and (3) amnesties that grant immunity for serious rights violations have no observable pacifying effects. These policy-relevant findings represent a new breakthrough in an ossified ``peace versus justice'' debate pitting security specialists against global human rights advocates.},
file = {Mallinder - 2012 - Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability .pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/RHR26RD8/Mallinder - 2012 - Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability .pdf:application/pdf},
isbn = {978-1-139-17715-3},
language = {en},
pages = {69--96},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {Amnesties' {Challenge} to the {Global} {Accountability} {Norm}?},
urldate = {2021-05-12},
year = {2012}}
@article{Daniels2020,
abstract = {In the difficult process of ending civil wars, granting amnesty during conflict is seen as a useful option, with an underpinning assumption that trading justice for peace is effective. However, is the case? This article tries to bring some clarity to when and how amnesty given during conflict has an impact. Amnesty should have different effects on diverse conflict endings: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or conflict reduction. The article also disaggregates amnesties to test direct impacts as an incentive or through reducing the commitment problem, and indirect effects that give military advantage to the government. Using a crossnational data set of amnesties in dyadic conflicts from 1975 to 2011, the research finds that amnesty's strongest effect is, surprisingly, not as an incentive but rather to reduce commitment problems. It can lead to negotiated settlements but also to government military advantage. The results have implications for negotiations and conflict resolution.},
file = {Daniels - 2020 - How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Confl.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/CJ2QM543/Daniels - 2020 - How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Confl.pdf:application/pdf},
issn = {0022-0027, 1552-8766},
journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
language = {en},
month = oct,
number = {9},
pages = {1612--1637},
title = {How and {When} {Amnesty} during {Conflict} {Affects} {Conflict} {Termination}},
abstract = {In recent years, several oppressive leaders have been arrested and extradited to international courts. What are the consequences of this global justice cascade? I address this question by examining patterns of exile. I show that the justice cascade has a differential effect on leaders based on their culpability (whether they presided over atrocity crimes). In the past, culpable and nonculpable leaders went into exile at virtually identical rates. Today, however, culpable leaders are about six times less likely to flee abroad because exile no longer guarantees a safe retirement. These findings raise stark implications for existing research that debates whether international justice deters atrocities or prolongs conflicts. My results about exiled leaders, I explain, imply that the justice cascade should deter atrocities and prolong conflicts. Thus, instead of debating whether international justice is helpful or harmful, future scholarship should carefully consider the trade-offs it creates.},
author = {Krcmaric, Daniel},
copyright = {{\copyright}2018, Midwest Political Science Association},
