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115 lines
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BibTeX
115 lines
7.3 KiB
BibTeX
%% This BibTeX bibliography file was created using BibDesk.
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%% Created for Myung Jung Kim at 2021-05-14 08:32:03 +0900
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@article{akhavan_2009,
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author = {Akhavan, Payam},
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date-modified = {2021-05-14 08:30:28 +0900},
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doi = {10.1353/hrq.0.0096},
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file = {Akhavan - 2009 - Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentiv.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/DM53UMXF/Akhavan - 2009 - Are International Criminal Tribunals a Disincentiv.pdf:application/pdf},
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issn = {1085-794X},
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journal = {Human Rights Quarterly},
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language = {en},
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number = {3},
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pages = {624--654},
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shorttitle = {Are {International} {Criminal} {Tribunals} a {Disincentive} to {Peace}?},
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title = {Are {International} {Criminal} {Tribunals} a {Disincentive} to {Peace}?: {Reconciling} {Judicial} {Romanticism} with {Political} {Realism}},
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url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v031/31.3.akhavan.html},
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urldate = {2021-02-26},
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volume = {31},
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year = {2009},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v031/31.3.akhavan.html},
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Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0096}}
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@article{chaudoin_2016,
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author = {Chaudoin, Stephen},
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date-modified = {2021-05-14 08:30:45 +0900},
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doi = {10.1086/684595},
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file = {Chaudoin - 2016 - How Contestation Moderates the Effects of Internat.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/EZJSSUU4/Chaudoin - 2016 - How Contestation Moderates the Effects of Internat.pdf:application/pdf},
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issn = {0022-3816, 1468-2508},
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journal = {The Journal of Politics},
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language = {en},
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month = apr,
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number = {2},
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pages = {557--571},
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shorttitle = {How {Contestation} {Moderates} the {Effects} of {International} {Institutions}},
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title = {How {Contestation} {Moderates} the {Effects} of {International} {Institutions}: {The} {International} {Criminal} {Court} and {Kenya}},
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url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/684595},
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urldate = {2021-02-26},
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volume = {78},
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year = {2016},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/684595},
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Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1086/684595}}
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@article{dancy_2018,
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abstract = {Do legal amnesties for combatants help end civil wars? International policy experts often take it for granted that amnesties promote negotiated settlements with rebels. However, a large number of amnesties are followed by continued fighting or a return to the battlefield. What, then, are the factors that make amnesties effective or ineffective? In this article I use a disaggregated data set of all amnesties enacted in the context of internal war since 1946 to evaluate a bargaining theory of amnesties and peace. Testing hypotheses about conflict patterns using models that account for selection, I find that (1) only amnesties passed following conflict termination help resolve civil wars, (2) amnesties are more effective when they are embedded in peace agreements, and (3) amnesties that grant immunity for serious rights violations have no observable pacifying effects. These policy-relevant findings represent a new breakthrough in an ossified ``peace versus justice'' debate pitting security specialists against global human rights advocates.},
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author = {Dancy, Geoff},
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date-modified = {2021-05-14 08:30:34 +0900},
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doi = {10.1017/S0020818318000012},
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file = {Dancy - 2018 - Deals with the Devil Conflict Amnesties, Civil Wa.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/PSUPMAMV/Dancy - 2018 - Deals with the Devil Conflict Amnesties, Civil Wa.pdf:application/pdf},
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issn = {0020-8183, 1531-5088},
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journal = {International Organization},
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language = {en},
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number = {2},
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pages = {387--421},
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shorttitle = {Deals with the {Devil}?},
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title = {Deals with the {Devil}? {Conflict} {Amnesties}, {Civil} {War}, and {Sustainable} {Peace}},
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url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818318000012/type/journal_article},
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urldate = {2021-02-26},
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volume = {72},
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year = {2018},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0020818318000012/type/journal_article},
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Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000012}}
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@incollection{lessa_2012,
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address = {Cambridge},
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author = {Mallinder, Louise},
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booktitle = {Amnesty in the {Age} of {Human} {Rights} {Accountability}},
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date-modified = {2021-05-14 08:30:20 +0900},
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doi = {10.1017/CBO9781139177153.007},
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editor = {Lessa, Francesca and Payne, Leigh A.},
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file = {Mallinder - 2012 - Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability .pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/RHR26RD8/Mallinder - 2012 - Amnesties' Challenge to the Global Accountability .pdf:application/pdf},
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isbn = {978-1-139-17715-3},
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language = {en},
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pages = {69--96},
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publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
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title = {Amnesties' {Challenge} to the {Global} {Accountability} {Norm}?},
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url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/CBO9781139177153A014/type/book_part},
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urldate = {2021-05-12},
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year = {2012},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/CBO9781139177153A014/type/book_part},
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Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139177153.007}}
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@article{daniels_2020,
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abstract = {In the difficult process of ending civil wars, granting amnesty during conflict is seen as a useful option, with an underpinning assumption that trading justice for peace is effective. However, is the case? This article tries to bring some clarity to when and how amnesty given during conflict has an impact. Amnesty should have different effects on diverse conflict endings: negotiated settlement, rebel victory, government victory, or conflict reduction. The article also disaggregates amnesties to test direct impacts as an incentive or through reducing the commitment problem, and indirect effects that give military advantage to the government. Using a crossnational data set of amnesties in dyadic conflicts from 1975 to 2011, the research finds that amnesty's strongest effect is, surprisingly, not as an incentive but rather to reduce commitment problems. It can lead to negotiated settlements but also to government military advantage. The results have implications for negotiations and conflict resolution.},
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author = {Daniels, Lesley-Ann},
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date-modified = {2021-05-14 08:30:40 +0900},
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doi = {10.1177/0022002720909884},
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file = {Daniels - 2020 - How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Confl.pdf:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/CJ2QM543/Daniels - 2020 - How and When Amnesty during Conflict Affects Confl.pdf:application/pdf},
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issn = {0022-0027, 1552-8766},
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journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution},
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language = {en},
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month = oct,
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number = {9},
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pages = {1612--1637},
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title = {How and {When} {Amnesty} during {Conflict} {Affects} {Conflict} {Termination}},
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url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002720909884},
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urldate = {2021-05-12},
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volume = {64},
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year = {2020},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002720909884},
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Bdsk-Url-2 = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720909884}}
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@misc{noauthor_zotero_nodate,
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file = {Zotero and BibTeX -- Reference Management Softwares:/Users/myungjung/Zotero/storage/K9D2RZYZ/zotero-and-bibtex.html:text/html},
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title = {Zotero and {BibTeX} -- {Reference} {Management} {Softwares}},
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url = {https://referencemanagement.pages.ist.ac.at/zotero/zotero-and-bibtex/},
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urldate = {2021-05-13},
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Bdsk-Url-1 = {https://referencemanagement.pages.ist.ac.at/zotero/zotero-and-bibtex/}}
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