caddy/modules/caddyhttp/server.go
Marten Seemann 32f7dd44ae
chore: Update quic-go to v0.42.0 (#6176)
* update quic-go to v0.42.0

* use a rate limiter to control QUIC source address verification

* Lint

* remove deprecated ListenQUIC

* remove number of requests tracking

* increase the number of handshakes before source address verification is needed

* remove references to request counters

* remove deprecated listen*

---------

Co-authored-by: Francis Lavoie <lavofr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: WeidiDeng <weidi_deng@icloud.com>
2024-03-21 10:56:10 -06:00

1028 lines
34 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2015 Matthew Holt and The Caddy Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
package caddyhttp
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/caddyserver/certmagic"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
"github.com/quic-go/quic-go/http3"
"go.uber.org/zap"
"go.uber.org/zap/zapcore"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddyevents"
"github.com/caddyserver/caddy/v2/modules/caddytls"
)
// Server describes an HTTP server.
type Server struct {
// Socket addresses to which to bind listeners. Accepts
// [network addresses](/docs/conventions#network-addresses)
// that may include port ranges. Listener addresses must
// be unique; they cannot be repeated across all defined
// servers.
Listen []string `json:"listen,omitempty"`
// A list of listener wrapper modules, which can modify the behavior
// of the base listener. They are applied in the given order.
ListenerWrappersRaw []json.RawMessage `json:"listener_wrappers,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=caddy.listeners inline_key=wrapper"`
// How long to allow a read from a client's upload. Setting this
// to a short, non-zero value can mitigate slowloris attacks, but
// may also affect legitimately slow clients.
ReadTimeout caddy.Duration `json:"read_timeout,omitempty"`
// ReadHeaderTimeout is like ReadTimeout but for request headers.
ReadHeaderTimeout caddy.Duration `json:"read_header_timeout,omitempty"`
// WriteTimeout is how long to allow a write to a client. Note
// that setting this to a small value when serving large files
// may negatively affect legitimately slow clients.
WriteTimeout caddy.Duration `json:"write_timeout,omitempty"`
// IdleTimeout is the maximum time to wait for the next request
// when keep-alives are enabled. If zero, a default timeout of
// 5m is applied to help avoid resource exhaustion.
IdleTimeout caddy.Duration `json:"idle_timeout,omitempty"`
// KeepAliveInterval is the interval at which TCP keepalive packets
// are sent to keep the connection alive at the TCP layer when no other
// data is being transmitted. The default is 15s.
KeepAliveInterval caddy.Duration `json:"keepalive_interval,omitempty"`
// MaxHeaderBytes is the maximum size to parse from a client's
// HTTP request headers.
MaxHeaderBytes int `json:"max_header_bytes,omitempty"`
// Enable full-duplex communication for HTTP/1 requests.
// Only has an effect if Caddy was built with Go 1.21 or later.
//
// For HTTP/1 requests, the Go HTTP server by default consumes any
// unread portion of the request body before beginning to write the
// response, preventing handlers from concurrently reading from the
// request and writing the response. Enabling this option disables
// this behavior and permits handlers to continue to read from the
// request while concurrently writing the response.
//
// For HTTP/2 requests, the Go HTTP server always permits concurrent
// reads and responses, so this option has no effect.
//
// Test thoroughly with your HTTP clients, as some older clients may
// not support full-duplex HTTP/1 which can cause them to deadlock.
// See https://github.com/golang/go/issues/57786 for more info.
//
// TODO: This is an EXPERIMENTAL feature. Subject to change or removal.
EnableFullDuplex bool `json:"enable_full_duplex,omitempty"`
// Routes describes how this server will handle requests.
// Routes are executed sequentially. First a route's matchers
// are evaluated, then its grouping. If it matches and has
// not been mutually-excluded by its grouping, then its
// handlers are executed sequentially. The sequence of invoked
// handlers comprises a compiled middleware chain that flows
// from each matching route and its handlers to the next.
//
// By default, all unrouted requests receive a 200 OK response
// to indicate the server is working.
Routes RouteList `json:"routes,omitempty"`
// Errors is how this server will handle errors returned from any
// of the handlers in the primary routes. If the primary handler
// chain returns an error, the error along with its recommended
// status code are bubbled back up to the HTTP server which
// executes a separate error route, specified using this property.
// The error routes work exactly like the normal routes.
Errors *HTTPErrorConfig `json:"errors,omitempty"`
// NamedRoutes describes a mapping of reusable routes that can be
// invoked by their name. This can be used to optimize memory usage
// when the same route is needed for many subroutes, by having
// the handlers and matchers be only provisioned once, but used from
// many places. These routes are not executed unless they are invoked
// from another route.
//
// EXPERIMENTAL: Subject to change or removal.
NamedRoutes map[string]*Route `json:"named_routes,omitempty"`
// How to handle TLS connections. At least one policy is
// required to enable HTTPS on this server if automatic
// HTTPS is disabled or does not apply.
TLSConnPolicies caddytls.ConnectionPolicies `json:"tls_connection_policies,omitempty"`
// AutoHTTPS configures or disables automatic HTTPS within this server.
// HTTPS is enabled automatically and by default when qualifying names
// are present in a Host matcher and/or when the server is listening
// only on the HTTPS port.
AutoHTTPS *AutoHTTPSConfig `json:"automatic_https,omitempty"`
// If true, will require that a request's Host header match
// the value of the ServerName sent by the client's TLS
// ClientHello; often a necessary safeguard when using TLS
// client authentication.
StrictSNIHost *bool `json:"strict_sni_host,omitempty"`
// A module which provides a source of IP ranges, from which
// requests should be trusted. By default, no proxies are
// trusted.
//
// On its own, this configuration will not do anything,
// but it can be used as a default set of ranges for
// handlers or matchers in routes to pick up, instead
// of needing to configure each of them. See the
// `reverse_proxy` handler for example, which uses this
// to trust sensitive incoming `X-Forwarded-*` headers.
TrustedProxiesRaw json.RawMessage `json:"trusted_proxies,omitempty" caddy:"namespace=http.ip_sources inline_key=source"`
// The headers from which the client IP address could be
// read from. These will be considered in order, with the
// first good value being used as the client IP.
// By default, only `X-Forwarded-For` is considered.
//
// This depends on `trusted_proxies` being configured and
// the request being validated as coming from a trusted
// proxy, otherwise the client IP will be set to the direct
// remote IP address.
ClientIPHeaders []string `json:"client_ip_headers,omitempty"`
// If greater than zero, enables strict ClientIPHeaders
// (default X-Forwarded-For) parsing. If enabled, the
// ClientIPHeaders will be parsed from right to left, and
// the first value that is both valid and doesn't match the
// trusted proxy list will be used as client IP. If zero,
// the ClientIPHeaders will be parsed from left to right,
// and the first value that is a valid IP address will be
// used as client IP.
//
// This depends on `trusted_proxies` being configured.
// This option is disabled by default.
TrustedProxiesStrict int `json:"trusted_proxies_strict,omitempty"`
// Enables access logging and configures how access logs are handled
// in this server. To minimally enable access logs, simply set this
// to a non-null, empty struct.
Logs *ServerLogConfig `json:"logs,omitempty"`
// Protocols specifies which HTTP protocols to enable.
// Supported values are:
//
// - `h1` (HTTP/1.1)
// - `h2` (HTTP/2)
// - `h2c` (cleartext HTTP/2)
// - `h3` (HTTP/3)
//
// If enabling `h2` or `h2c`, `h1` must also be enabled;
// this is due to current limitations in the Go standard
// library.
//
// HTTP/2 operates only over TLS (HTTPS). HTTP/3 opens
// a UDP socket to serve QUIC connections.
//
// H2C operates over plain TCP if the client supports it;
// however, because this is not implemented by the Go
// standard library, other server options are not compatible
// and will not be applied to H2C requests. Do not enable this
// only to achieve maximum client compatibility. In practice,
// very few clients implement H2C, and even fewer require it.
// Enabling H2C can be useful for serving/proxying gRPC
// if encryption is not possible or desired.
//
// We recommend for most users to simply let Caddy use the
// default settings.
//
// Default: `[h1 h2 h3]`
Protocols []string `json:"protocols,omitempty"`
// If set, metrics observations will be enabled.
// This setting is EXPERIMENTAL and subject to change.
Metrics *Metrics `json:"metrics,omitempty"`
name string
primaryHandlerChain Handler
errorHandlerChain Handler
listenerWrappers []caddy.ListenerWrapper
listeners []net.Listener
tlsApp *caddytls.TLS
events *caddyevents.App
logger *zap.Logger
accessLogger *zap.Logger
errorLogger *zap.Logger
ctx caddy.Context
server *http.Server
h3server *http3.Server
h2listeners []*http2Listener
addresses []caddy.NetworkAddress
trustedProxies IPRangeSource
shutdownAt time.Time
shutdownAtMu *sync.RWMutex
// registered callback functions
connStateFuncs []func(net.Conn, http.ConnState)
connContextFuncs []func(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context
onShutdownFuncs []func()
onStopFuncs []func(context.Context) error // TODO: Experimental (Nov. 2023)
}
// ServeHTTP is the entry point for all HTTP requests.
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// If there are listener wrappers that process tls connections but don't return a *tls.Conn, this field will be nil.
// TODO: Can be removed if https://github.com/golang/go/pull/56110 is ever merged.
if r.TLS == nil {
// not all requests have a conn (like virtual requests) - see #5698
if conn, ok := r.Context().Value(ConnCtxKey).(net.Conn); ok {
if csc, ok := conn.(connectionStateConn); ok {
r.TLS = new(tls.ConnectionState)
*r.TLS = csc.ConnectionState()
}
}
}
w.Header().Set("Server", "Caddy")
// advertise HTTP/3, if enabled
if s.h3server != nil {
if r.ProtoMajor < 3 {
err := s.h3server.SetQuicHeaders(w.Header())
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("setting HTTP/3 Alt-Svc header", zap.Error(err))
}
}
}
// reject very long methods; probably a mistake or an attack
if len(r.Method) > 32 {
if s.shouldLogRequest(r) {
s.accessLogger.Debug("rejecting request with long method",
zap.String("method_trunc", r.Method[:32]),
zap.String("remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr))
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
repl := caddy.NewReplacer()
r = PrepareRequest(r, repl, w, s)
// enable full-duplex for HTTP/1, ensuring the entire
// request body gets consumed before writing the response
if s.EnableFullDuplex && r.ProtoMajor == 1 {
//nolint:bodyclose
err := http.NewResponseController(w).EnableFullDuplex()
if err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("failed to enable full duplex", zap.Error(err))
}
}
// encode the request for logging purposes before
// it enters any handler chain; this is necessary
// to capture the original request in case it gets
// modified during handling
shouldLogCredentials := s.Logs != nil && s.Logs.ShouldLogCredentials
loggableReq := zap.Object("request", LoggableHTTPRequest{
Request: r,
ShouldLogCredentials: shouldLogCredentials,
})
errLog := s.errorLogger.With(loggableReq)
var duration time.Duration
if s.shouldLogRequest(r) {
wrec := NewResponseRecorder(w, nil, nil)
w = wrec
// wrap the request body in a LengthReader
// so we can track the number of bytes read from it
var bodyReader *lengthReader
if r.Body != nil {
bodyReader = &lengthReader{Source: r.Body}
r.Body = bodyReader
}
// capture the original version of the request
accLog := s.accessLogger.With(loggableReq)
defer s.logRequest(accLog, r, wrec, &duration, repl, bodyReader, shouldLogCredentials)
}
start := time.Now()
// guarantee ACME HTTP challenges; handle them
// separately from any user-defined handlers
if s.tlsApp.HandleHTTPChallenge(w, r) {
duration = time.Since(start)
return
}
// execute the primary handler chain
err := s.primaryHandlerChain.ServeHTTP(w, r)
duration = time.Since(start)
// if no errors, we're done!
if err == nil {
return
}
// restore original request before invoking error handler chain (issue #3717)
// TODO: this does not restore original headers, if modified (for efficiency)
origReq := r.Context().Value(OriginalRequestCtxKey).(http.Request)
r.Method = origReq.Method
r.RemoteAddr = origReq.RemoteAddr
r.RequestURI = origReq.RequestURI
cloneURL(origReq.URL, r.URL)
// prepare the error log
logger := errLog
if s.Logs != nil {
logger = s.Logs.wrapLogger(logger, r.Host)
}
logger = logger.With(zap.Duration("duration", duration))
// get the values that will be used to log the error
errStatus, errMsg, errFields := errLogValues(err)
// add HTTP error information to request context
r = s.Errors.WithError(r, err)
if s.Errors != nil && len(s.Errors.Routes) > 0 {
// execute user-defined error handling route
err2 := s.errorHandlerChain.ServeHTTP(w, r)
if err2 == nil {
// user's error route handled the error response
// successfully, so now just log the error
logger.Debug(errMsg, errFields...)
} else {
// well... this is awkward
errFields = append([]zapcore.Field{
zap.String("error", err2.Error()),
zap.Namespace("first_error"),
zap.String("msg", errMsg),
}, errFields...)
logger.Error("error handling handler error", errFields...)
if handlerErr, ok := err.(HandlerError); ok {
w.WriteHeader(handlerErr.StatusCode)
} else {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
}
} else {
if errStatus >= 500 {
logger.Error(errMsg, errFields...)
} else {
logger.Debug(errMsg, errFields...)
}
w.WriteHeader(errStatus)
}
}
// wrapPrimaryRoute wraps stack (a compiled middleware handler chain)
// in s.enforcementHandler which performs crucial security checks, etc.
func (s *Server) wrapPrimaryRoute(stack Handler) Handler {
return HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) error {
return s.enforcementHandler(w, r, stack)
})
}
// enforcementHandler is an implicit middleware which performs
// standard checks before executing the HTTP middleware chain.
func (s *Server) enforcementHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, next Handler) error {
// enforce strict host matching, which ensures that the SNI
// value (if any), matches the Host header; essential for
// servers that rely on TLS ClientAuth sharing a listener
// with servers that do not; if not enforced, client could
// bypass by sending benign SNI then restricted Host header
if s.StrictSNIHost != nil && *s.StrictSNIHost && r.TLS != nil {
hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.Host)
if err != nil {
hostname = r.Host // OK; probably lacked port
}
if !strings.EqualFold(r.TLS.ServerName, hostname) {
err := fmt.Errorf("strict host matching: TLS ServerName (%s) and HTTP Host (%s) values differ",
r.TLS.ServerName, hostname)
r.Close = true
return Error(http.StatusMisdirectedRequest, err)
}
}
return next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}
// listenersUseAnyPortOtherThan returns true if there are any
// listeners in s that use a port which is not otherPort.
func (s *Server) listenersUseAnyPortOtherThan(otherPort int) bool {
for _, lnAddr := range s.Listen {
laddrs, err := caddy.ParseNetworkAddress(lnAddr)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if uint(otherPort) > laddrs.EndPort || uint(otherPort) < laddrs.StartPort {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// hasListenerAddress returns true if s has a listener
// at the given address fullAddr. Currently, fullAddr
// must represent exactly one socket address (port
// ranges are not supported)
func (s *Server) hasListenerAddress(fullAddr string) bool {
laddrs, err := caddy.ParseNetworkAddress(fullAddr)
if err != nil {
return false
}
if laddrs.PortRangeSize() != 1 {
return false // TODO: support port ranges
}
for _, lnAddr := range s.Listen {
thisAddrs, err := caddy.ParseNetworkAddress(lnAddr)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if thisAddrs.Network != laddrs.Network {
continue
}
// Apparently, Linux requires all bound ports to be distinct
// *regardless of host interface* even if the addresses are
// in fact different; binding "192.168.0.1:9000" and then
// ":9000" will fail for ":9000" because "address is already
// in use" even though it's not, and the same bindings work
// fine on macOS. I also found on Linux that listening on
// "[::]:9000" would fail with a similar error, except with
// the address "0.0.0.0:9000", as if deliberately ignoring
// that I specified the IPv6 interface explicitly. This seems
// to be a major bug in the Linux network stack and I don't
// know why it hasn't been fixed yet, so for now we have to
// special-case ourselves around Linux like a doting parent.
// The second issue seems very similar to a discussion here:
// https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/9390
//
// This is very easy to reproduce by creating an HTTP server
// that listens to both addresses or just one with a host
// interface; or for a more confusing reproduction, try
// listening on "127.0.0.1:80" and ":443" and you'll see
// the error, if you take away the GOOS condition below.
//
// So, an address is equivalent if the port is in the port
// range, and if not on Linux, the host is the same... sigh.
if (runtime.GOOS == "linux" || thisAddrs.Host == laddrs.Host) &&
(laddrs.StartPort <= thisAddrs.EndPort) &&
(laddrs.StartPort >= thisAddrs.StartPort) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *Server) hasTLSClientAuth() bool {
for _, cp := range s.TLSConnPolicies {
if cp.ClientAuthentication != nil && cp.ClientAuthentication.Active() {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// findLastRouteWithHostMatcher returns the index of the last route
// in the server which has a host matcher. Used during Automatic HTTPS
// to determine where to insert the HTTP->HTTPS redirect route, such
// that it is after any other host matcher but before any "catch-all"
// route without a host matcher.
func (s *Server) findLastRouteWithHostMatcher() int {
foundHostMatcher := false
lastIndex := len(s.Routes)
for i, route := range s.Routes {
// since we want to break out of an inner loop, use a closure
// to allow us to use 'return' when we found a host matcher
found := (func() bool {
for _, sets := range route.MatcherSets {
for _, matcher := range sets {
switch matcher.(type) {
case *MatchHost:
foundHostMatcher = true
return true
}
}
}
return false
})()
// if we found the host matcher, change the lastIndex to
// just after the current route
if found {
lastIndex = i + 1
}
}
// If we didn't actually find a host matcher, return 0
// because that means every defined route was a "catch-all".
// See https://caddy.community/t/how-to-set-priority-in-caddyfile/13002/8
if !foundHostMatcher {
return 0
}
return lastIndex
}
// serveHTTP3 creates a QUIC listener, configures an HTTP/3 server if
// not already done, and then uses that server to serve HTTP/3 over
// the listener, with Server s as the handler.
func (s *Server) serveHTTP3(addr caddy.NetworkAddress, tlsCfg *tls.Config) error {
addr.Network = getHTTP3Network(addr.Network)
h3ln, err := addr.ListenQUIC(s.ctx, 0, net.ListenConfig{}, tlsCfg)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("starting HTTP/3 QUIC listener: %v", err)
}
// create HTTP/3 server if not done already
if s.h3server == nil {
s.h3server = &http3.Server{
Handler: s,
TLSConfig: tlsCfg,
MaxHeaderBytes: s.MaxHeaderBytes,
// TODO: remove this config when draft versions are no longer supported (we have no need to support drafts)
QuicConfig: &quic.Config{
Versions: []quic.VersionNumber{quic.Version1, quic.Version2},
},
}
}
//nolint:errcheck
go s.h3server.ServeListener(h3ln)
return nil
}
// configureServer applies/binds the registered callback functions to the server.
func (s *Server) configureServer(server *http.Server) {
for _, f := range s.connStateFuncs {
if server.ConnState != nil {
baseConnStateFunc := server.ConnState
server.ConnState = func(conn net.Conn, state http.ConnState) {
baseConnStateFunc(conn, state)
f(conn, state)
}
} else {
server.ConnState = f
}
}
for _, f := range s.connContextFuncs {
if server.ConnContext != nil {
baseConnContextFunc := server.ConnContext
server.ConnContext = func(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context {
return f(baseConnContextFunc(ctx, c), c)
}
} else {
server.ConnContext = f
}
}
for _, f := range s.onShutdownFuncs {
server.RegisterOnShutdown(f)
}
}
// RegisterConnState registers f to be invoked on s.ConnState.
func (s *Server) RegisterConnState(f func(net.Conn, http.ConnState)) {
s.connStateFuncs = append(s.connStateFuncs, f)
}
// RegisterConnContext registers f to be invoked as part of s.ConnContext.
func (s *Server) RegisterConnContext(f func(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context) {
s.connContextFuncs = append(s.connContextFuncs, f)
}
// RegisterOnShutdown registers f to be invoked when the server begins to shut down.
func (s *Server) RegisterOnShutdown(f func()) {
s.onShutdownFuncs = append(s.onShutdownFuncs, f)
}
// RegisterOnStop registers f to be invoked after the server has shut down completely.
//
// EXPERIMENTAL: Subject to change or removal.
func (s *Server) RegisterOnStop(f func(context.Context) error) {
s.onStopFuncs = append(s.onStopFuncs, f)
}
// HTTPErrorConfig determines how to handle errors
// from the HTTP handlers.
type HTTPErrorConfig struct {
// The routes to evaluate after the primary handler
// chain returns an error. In an error route, extra
// placeholders are available:
//
// Placeholder | Description
// ------------|---------------
// `{http.error.status_code}` | The recommended HTTP status code
// `{http.error.status_text}` | The status text associated with the recommended status code
// `{http.error.message}` | The error message
// `{http.error.trace}` | The origin of the error
// `{http.error.id}` | An identifier for this occurrence of the error
Routes RouteList `json:"routes,omitempty"`
}
// WithError makes a shallow copy of r to add the error to its
// context, and sets placeholders on the request's replacer
// related to err. It returns the modified request which has
// the error information in its context and replacer. It
// overwrites any existing error values that are stored.
func (*HTTPErrorConfig) WithError(r *http.Request, err error) *http.Request {
// add the raw error value to the request context
// so it can be accessed by error handlers
c := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ErrorCtxKey, err)
r = r.WithContext(c)
// add error values to the replacer
repl := r.Context().Value(caddy.ReplacerCtxKey).(*caddy.Replacer)
repl.Set("http.error", err)
if handlerErr, ok := err.(HandlerError); ok {
repl.Set("http.error.status_code", handlerErr.StatusCode)
repl.Set("http.error.status_text", http.StatusText(handlerErr.StatusCode))
repl.Set("http.error.id", handlerErr.ID)
repl.Set("http.error.trace", handlerErr.Trace)
if handlerErr.Err != nil {
repl.Set("http.error.message", handlerErr.Err.Error())
} else {
repl.Set("http.error.message", http.StatusText(handlerErr.StatusCode))
}
}
return r
}
// shouldLogRequest returns true if this request should be logged.
func (s *Server) shouldLogRequest(r *http.Request) bool {
if s.accessLogger == nil || s.Logs == nil {
// logging is disabled
return false
}
if _, ok := s.Logs.LoggerNames[r.Host]; ok {
// this host is mapped to a particular logger name
return true
}
for _, dh := range s.Logs.SkipHosts {
// logging for this particular host is disabled
if certmagic.MatchWildcard(r.Host, dh) {
return false
}
}
// if configured, this host is not mapped and thus must not be logged
return !s.Logs.SkipUnmappedHosts
}
// logRequest logs the request to access logs, unless skipped.
func (s *Server) logRequest(
accLog *zap.Logger, r *http.Request, wrec ResponseRecorder, duration *time.Duration,
repl *caddy.Replacer, bodyReader *lengthReader, shouldLogCredentials bool,
) {
// this request may be flagged as omitted from the logs
if skip, ok := GetVar(r.Context(), LogSkipVar).(bool); ok && skip {
return
}
repl.Set("http.response.status", wrec.Status()) // will be 0 if no response is written by us (Go will write 200 to client)
repl.Set("http.response.size", wrec.Size())
repl.Set("http.response.duration", duration)
repl.Set("http.response.duration_ms", duration.Seconds()*1e3) // multiply seconds to preserve decimal (see #4666)
logger := accLog
if s.Logs != nil {
logger = s.Logs.wrapLogger(logger, r.Host)
}
log := logger.Info
if wrec.Status() >= 400 {
log = logger.Error
}
userID, _ := repl.GetString("http.auth.user.id")
reqBodyLength := 0
if bodyReader != nil {
reqBodyLength = bodyReader.Length
}
extra := r.Context().Value(ExtraLogFieldsCtxKey).(*ExtraLogFields)
fieldCount := 6
fields := make([]zapcore.Field, 0, fieldCount+len(extra.fields))
fields = append(fields,
zap.Int("bytes_read", reqBodyLength),
zap.String("user_id", userID),
zap.Duration("duration", *duration),
zap.Int("size", wrec.Size()),
zap.Int("status", wrec.Status()),
zap.Object("resp_headers", LoggableHTTPHeader{
Header: wrec.Header(),
ShouldLogCredentials: shouldLogCredentials,
}))
fields = append(fields, extra.fields...)
log("handled request", fields...)
}
// protocol returns true if the protocol proto is configured/enabled.
func (s *Server) protocol(proto string) bool {
for _, p := range s.Protocols {
if p == proto {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// Listeners returns the server's listeners. These are active listeners,
// so calling Accept() or Close() on them will probably break things.
// They are made available here for read-only purposes (e.g. Addr())
// and for type-asserting for purposes where you know what you're doing.
//
// EXPERIMENTAL: Subject to change or removal.
func (s *Server) Listeners() []net.Listener { return s.listeners }
// Name returns the server's name.
func (s *Server) Name() string { return s.name }
// PrepareRequest fills the request r for use in a Caddy HTTP handler chain. w and s can
// be nil, but the handlers will lose response placeholders and access to the server.
func PrepareRequest(r *http.Request, repl *caddy.Replacer, w http.ResponseWriter, s *Server) *http.Request {
// set up the context for the request
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), caddy.ReplacerCtxKey, repl)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ServerCtxKey, s)
trusted, clientIP := determineTrustedProxy(r, s)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, VarsCtxKey, map[string]any{
TrustedProxyVarKey: trusted,
ClientIPVarKey: clientIP,
})
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, routeGroupCtxKey, make(map[string]struct{}))
var url2 url.URL // avoid letting this escape to the heap
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, OriginalRequestCtxKey, originalRequest(r, &url2))
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ExtraLogFieldsCtxKey, new(ExtraLogFields))
r = r.WithContext(ctx)
// once the pointer to the request won't change
// anymore, finish setting up the replacer
addHTTPVarsToReplacer(repl, r, w)
return r
}
// originalRequest returns a partial, shallow copy of
// req, including: req.Method, deep copy of req.URL
// (into the urlCopy parameter, which should be on the
// stack), req.RequestURI, and req.RemoteAddr. Notably,
// headers are not copied. This function is designed to
// be very fast and efficient, and useful primarily for
// read-only/logging purposes.
func originalRequest(req *http.Request, urlCopy *url.URL) http.Request {
cloneURL(req.URL, urlCopy)
return http.Request{
Method: req.Method,
RemoteAddr: req.RemoteAddr,
RequestURI: req.RequestURI,
URL: urlCopy,
}
}
// determineTrustedProxy parses the remote IP address of
// the request, and determines (if the server configured it)
// if the client is a trusted proxy. If trusted, also returns
// the real client IP if possible.
func determineTrustedProxy(r *http.Request, s *Server) (bool, string) {
// If there's no server, then we can't check anything
if s == nil {
return false, ""
}
// Parse the remote IP, ignore the error as non-fatal,
// but the remote IP is required to continue, so we
// just return early. This should probably never happen
// though, unless some other module manipulated the request's
// remote address and used an invalid value.
clientIP, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return false, ""
}
// Client IP may contain a zone if IPv6, so we need
// to pull that out before parsing the IP
clientIP, _, _ = strings.Cut(clientIP, "%")
ipAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(clientIP)
if err != nil {
return false, ""
}
// Check if the client is a trusted proxy
if s.trustedProxies == nil {
return false, ipAddr.String()
}
if isTrustedClientIP(ipAddr, s.trustedProxies.GetIPRanges(r)) {
if s.TrustedProxiesStrict > 0 {
return true, strictUntrustedClientIp(r, s.ClientIPHeaders, s.trustedProxies.GetIPRanges(r), ipAddr.String())
}
return true, trustedRealClientIP(r, s.ClientIPHeaders, ipAddr.String())
}
return false, ipAddr.String()
}
// isTrustedClientIP returns true if the given IP address is
// in the list of trusted IP ranges.
func isTrustedClientIP(ipAddr netip.Addr, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
for _, ipRange := range trusted {
if ipRange.Contains(ipAddr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// trustedRealClientIP finds the client IP from the request assuming it is
// from a trusted client. If there is no client IP headers, then the
// direct remote address is returned. If there are client IP headers,
// then the first value from those headers is used.
func trustedRealClientIP(r *http.Request, headers []string, clientIP string) string {
// Read all the values of the configured client IP headers, in order
var values []string
for _, field := range headers {
values = append(values, r.Header.Values(field)...)
}
// If we don't have any values, then give up
if len(values) == 0 {
return clientIP
}
// Since there can be many header values, we need to
// join them together before splitting to get the full list
allValues := strings.Split(strings.Join(values, ","), ",")
// Get first valid left-most IP address
for _, part := range allValues {
// Some proxies may retain the port number, so split if possible
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(part)
if err != nil {
host = part
}
// Remove any zone identifier from the IP address
host, _, _ = strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(host), "%")
// Parse the IP address
ipAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil {
continue
}
return ipAddr.String()
}
// We didn't find a valid IP
return clientIP
}
// strictUntrustedClientIp iterates through the list of client IP headers,
// parses them from right-to-left, and returns the first valid IP address
// that is untrusted. If no valid IP address is found, then the direct
// remote address is returned.
func strictUntrustedClientIp(r *http.Request, headers []string, trusted []netip.Prefix, clientIP string) string {
for _, headerName := range headers {
parts := strings.Split(strings.Join(r.Header.Values(headerName), ","), ",")
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
// Some proxies may retain the port number, so split if possible
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(parts[i])
if err != nil {
host = parts[i]
}
// Remove any zone identifier from the IP address
host, _, _ = strings.Cut(strings.TrimSpace(host), "%")
// Parse the IP address
ipAddr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if !isTrustedClientIP(ipAddr, trusted) {
return ipAddr.String()
}
}
}
return clientIP
}
// cloneURL makes a copy of r.URL and returns a
// new value that doesn't reference the original.
func cloneURL(from, to *url.URL) {
*to = *from
if from.User != nil {
userInfo := new(url.Userinfo)
*userInfo = *from.User
to.User = userInfo
}
}
// lengthReader is an io.ReadCloser that keeps track of the
// number of bytes read from the request body.
type lengthReader struct {
Source io.ReadCloser
Length int
}
func (r *lengthReader) Read(b []byte) (int, error) {
n, err := r.Source.Read(b)
r.Length += n
return n, err
}
func (r *lengthReader) Close() error {
return r.Source.Close()
}
// Context keys for HTTP request context values.
const (
// For referencing the server instance
ServerCtxKey caddy.CtxKey = "server"
// For the request's variable table
VarsCtxKey caddy.CtxKey = "vars"
// For a partial copy of the unmodified request that
// originally came into the server's entry handler
OriginalRequestCtxKey caddy.CtxKey = "original_request"
// For referencing underlying net.Conn
ConnCtxKey caddy.CtxKey = "conn"
// For tracking whether the client is a trusted proxy
TrustedProxyVarKey string = "trusted_proxy"
// For tracking the real client IP (affected by trusted_proxy)
ClientIPVarKey string = "client_ip"
)
var networkTypesHTTP3 = map[string]string{
"unix": "unixgram",
"tcp4": "udp4",
"tcp6": "udp6",
}
// RegisterNetworkHTTP3 registers a mapping from non-HTTP/3 network to HTTP/3
// network. This should be called during init() and will panic if the network
// type is standard, reserved, or already registered.
//
// EXPERIMENTAL: Subject to change.
func RegisterNetworkHTTP3(originalNetwork, h3Network string) {
if _, ok := networkTypesHTTP3[strings.ToLower(originalNetwork)]; ok {
panic("network type " + originalNetwork + " is already registered")
}
networkTypesHTTP3[originalNetwork] = h3Network
}
func getHTTP3Network(originalNetwork string) string {
h3Network, ok := networkTypesHTTP3[strings.ToLower(originalNetwork)]
if !ok {
// TODO: Maybe a better default is to not enable HTTP/3 if we do not know the network?
return "udp"
}
return h3Network
}