FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-18 04:27:30 +08:00
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# frozen_string_literal: true
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2022-07-28 10:27:38 +08:00
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RSpec.describe "RequestTracker in multisite", type: :multisite do
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FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-18 04:27:30 +08:00
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before do
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global_setting :skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level, 2
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RateLimiter.enable
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test_multisite_connection("default") { RateLimiter.clear_all! }
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test_multisite_connection("second") { RateLimiter.clear_all! }
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RateLimiter.clear_all_global!
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end
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def call(env, &block)
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Middleware::RequestTracker.new(block).call(env)
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end
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def create_env(opts)
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create_request_env.merge(opts)
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end
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shared_examples "ip rate limiters behavior" do |error_code, app_callback|
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it "applies rate limits on an IP address across all sites" do
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called = { default: 0, second: 0 }
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test_multisite_connection("default") do
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4")
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status, =
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call(env) do
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called[:default] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(200)
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4")
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status, headers =
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call(env) do
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called[:default] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(429)
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expect(headers["Discourse-Rate-Limit-Error-Code"]).to eq(error_code)
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expect(called[:default]).to eq(1)
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end
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test_multisite_connection("second") do
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4")
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status, headers =
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call(env) do
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called[:second] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(429)
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expect(headers["Discourse-Rate-Limit-Error-Code"]).to eq(error_code)
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expect(called[:second]).to eq(0)
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end
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end
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end
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shared_examples "user id rate limiters behavior" do |error_code, app_callback|
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it "does not leak rate limits for a user id to other sites" do
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cookie = create_auth_cookie(token: SecureRandom.hex, user_id: 1, trust_level: 2)
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called = { default: 0, second: 0 }
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test_multisite_connection("default") do
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4", "HTTP_COOKIE" => "_t=#{cookie}")
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status, =
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call(env) do
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called[:default] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(200)
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4", "HTTP_COOKIE" => "_t=#{cookie}")
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status, headers, =
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call(env) do
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called[:default] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(429)
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expect(headers["Discourse-Rate-Limit-Error-Code"]).to eq(error_code)
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expect(called[:default]).to eq(1)
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end
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test_multisite_connection("second") do
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4", "HTTP_COOKIE" => "_t=#{cookie}")
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status, =
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call(env) do
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called[:second] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(200)
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env = create_env("REMOTE_ADDR" => "123.10.71.4", "HTTP_COOKIE" => "_t=#{cookie}")
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status, headers, =
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call(env) do
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called[:second] += 1
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app_callback&.call(env)
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[200, {}, ["OK"]]
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end
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expect(status).to eq(429)
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expect(headers["Discourse-Rate-Limit-Error-Code"]).to eq(error_code)
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expect(called[:second]).to eq(1)
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end
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end
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end
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2022-07-28 00:14:14 +08:00
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context "with a 10 seconds limiter" do
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FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-18 04:27:30 +08:00
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before { global_setting :max_reqs_per_ip_per_10_seconds, 1 }
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include_examples "ip rate limiters behavior", "ip_10_secs_limit"
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include_examples "user id rate limiters behavior", "id_10_secs_limit"
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end
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2022-07-28 00:14:14 +08:00
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context "with a 60 seconds limiter" do
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FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-18 04:27:30 +08:00
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before { global_setting :max_reqs_per_ip_per_minute, 1 }
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include_examples "ip rate limiters behavior", "ip_60_secs_limit"
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include_examples "user id rate limiters behavior", "id_60_secs_limit"
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end
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2022-07-28 00:14:14 +08:00
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context "with assets 10 seconds limiter" do
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FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-18 04:27:30 +08:00
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before { global_setting :max_asset_reqs_per_ip_per_10_seconds, 1 }
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app_callback = ->(env) { env["DISCOURSE_IS_ASSET_PATH"] = true }
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include_examples "ip rate limiters behavior", "ip_assets_10_secs_limit", app_callback
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include_examples "user id rate limiters behavior", "id_assets_10_secs_limit", app_callback
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end
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end
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