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DEV: Update webauthn authentication documentation (#23787)

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Also adds a `userHandle` check for first factor verification, though this is not yet implemented in Rails controllers and UI.
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Penar Musaraj 2023-10-05 15:22:43 -04:00 committed by GitHub
parent 8a6aaf9446
commit 921f1279b9
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4 changed files with 92 additions and 34 deletions
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21
app/assets/javascripts/discourse/app/lib/webauthn.js
View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import I18n from "I18n";
export function stringToBuffer(str) {
let buffer = new ArrayBuffer(str.length);
let byteView = new Uint8Array(buffer);
@ -33,7 +34,10 @@ export function getWebauthnCredential(
type: "public-key",
};
});
// See https://w3c.github.io/webauthn/#sctn-verifying-assertion for the steps followed here.
// 1. Let options be a new PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions structure configured to the Relying Party's needs
// 2. Call navigator.credentials.get() and pass options as the publicKey option.
navigator.credentials
.get({
publicKey: {
@ -48,8 +52,19 @@ export function getWebauthnCredential(
},
})
.then((credential) => {
// 1. if there is a credential, check if the raw ID base64 matches
// any of the allowed credential ids
// 3. If credential.response is not an instance of AuthenticatorAssertionResponse, abort the ceremony.
// eslint-disable-next-line no-undef
if (!(credential.response instanceof AuthenticatorAssertionResponse)) {
return errorCallback(
I18n.t("login.security_key_invalid_response_error")
);
}
// 4. Let clientExtensionResults be the result of calling credential.getClientExtensionResults().
// We are not using this
// 5. If options.allowCredentials is not empty, verify that credential.id identifies one of the public key
// credentials listed in options.allowCredentials.
if (
!allowedCredentialIds.some(
(credentialId) => bufferToBase64(credential.rawId) === credentialId
@ -68,7 +83,9 @@ export function getWebauthnCredential(
),
credentialId: bufferToBase64(credential.rawId),
};
successCallback(credentialData);
// steps 6+ of this flow are handled by lib/discourse_webauthn/authentication_service.rb
})
.catch((err) => {
if (err.name === "NotAllowedError") {

1
config/locales/client.en.yml
View File

@ -2169,6 +2169,7 @@ en:
security_key_not_allowed_error: "The security key authentication process either timed out or was cancelled."
security_key_no_matching_credential_error: "No matching credentials could be found in the provided security key."
security_key_support_missing_error: "Your current device or browser does not support the use of security keys. Please use a different method."
security_key_invalid_response_error: "The security key authentication process failed due to an invalid response."
email_placeholder: "Email / Username"
caps_lock_warning: "Caps Lock is on"
error: "Unknown error"

73
lib/discourse_webauthn/authentication_service.rb
View File

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ module DiscourseWebauthn
# the steps followed here. Memoized methods are called in their
# place in the step flow to make the process clearer.
def authenticate_security_key
# Steps 1-5 of this authentication flow are in the frontend at lib/webauthn.js
if @params.blank? || (!@params.is_a?(Hash) && !@params.is_a?(ActionController::Parameters))
raise(
MalformedPublicKeyCredentialError,
@ -15,63 +16,75 @@ module DiscourseWebauthn
)
end
# 6. Identify the user being authenticated and verify that this user is the
# owner of the public key credential source credentialSource identified by credential.id:
# 6a. If the user was identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated,
# verify that the identified user account contains a credential record whose id equals credential.rawId.
security_key = UserSecurityKey.find_by(credential_id: @params[:credentialId])
raise(KeyNotFoundError, I18n.t("webauthn.validation.not_found_error")) if security_key.blank?
# 3. Identify the user being authenticated and verify that this user is the
# owner of the public key credential source credentialSource identified by credential.id:
if @factor_type == UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:second_factor] &&
(@current_user == nil || security_key.user == nil || security_key.user != @current_user)
raise(OwnershipError, I18n.t("webauthn.validation.ownership_error"))
end
# 4. Using credential.id (or credential.rawId, if base64url encoding is inappropriate for your use case),
# look up the corresponding credential public key and let credentialPublicKey be that credential public key.
public_key = security_key.public_key
# 6b. If the user was not identified before the authentication ceremony was initiated,
# verify that response.userHandle is present. Verify that the user account identified by response.userHandle
# contains a credential record whose id equals credential.rawId
if @factor_type == UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor] &&
Base64.decode64(@params[:userHandle]) != @current_user.secure_identifier
raise(OwnershipError, I18n.t("webauthn.validation.ownership_error"))
end
# 5. Let cData, authData and sig denote the value of credential’s response's clientDataJSON, authenticatorData, and signature respectively.
# 6. Let JSONtext be the result of running UTF-8 decode on the value of cData.
# 7. Let C, the client data claimed as used for the signature, be the result of running an implementation-specific JSON parser on JSONtext.
# 7. No upstream step
# 8. No upstream step
# 9. Let cData, authData and sig denote the value of credential’s response's clientDataJSON, authenticatorData, and signature respectively.
# 10. Let JSONtext be the result of running UTF-8 decode on the value of cData.
# 11. Let C, the client data claimed as used for the signature, be the result of running an implementation-specific JSON parser on JSONtext.
client_data
# 8. Verify that the value of C.type is the string webauthn.get.
# 12. Verify that the value of C.type is the string webauthn.get.
validate_webauthn_type(::DiscourseWebauthn::ACCEPTABLE_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE)
# 9. Verify that the value of C.challenge equals the base64url encoding of options.challenge.
# 13. Verify that the value of C.challenge equals the base64url encoding of options.challenge.
validate_challenge
# 10. Verify that the value of C.origin matches the Relying Party's origin.
# 14. Verify that the value of C.origin matches the Relying Party's origin.
validate_origin
# 11. Verify that the value of C.tokenBinding.status matches the state of Token Binding for the TLS connection
# over which the attestation was obtained. If Token Binding was used on that TLS connection, also verify
# that C.tokenBinding.id matches the base64url encoding of the Token Binding ID for the connection.
# Not using this right now.
# 15. If C.topOrigin is present:
# - Verify that the Relying Party expects this credential to be used within an iframe that is not same-origin with its ancestors.
# - Verify that the value of C.topOrigin matches the origin of a page that the Relying Party expects to be sub-framed within.
# We are not using this.
# 12. Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party.
# 16. Verify that the rpIdHash in authData is the SHA-256 hash of the RP ID expected by the Relying Party.
validate_rp_id_hash
# 13. Verify that the User Present bit of the flags in authData is set.
# 17. Verify that the User Present bit of the flags in authData is set.
# https://blog.bigbinary.com/2011/07/20/ruby-pack-unpack.html
#
validate_user_presence
#
# 14. If user verification is required for this registration, verify that
# the User Verified bit of the flags in authData is set.
# 18. Determine whether user verification is required for this assertion.
# User verification SHOULD be required if, and only if, options.userVerification is set to required.
# If user verification was determined to be required, verify that the UV bit of the flags in authData is set.
# Otherwise, ignore the value of the UV flag.
validate_user_verification if @factor_type == UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor]
# 15. Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults and the authenticator
# extension outputs in the extensions in authData are as expected, considering the client extension input
# values that were given in options.extensions and any specific policy of the Relying Party regarding
# unsolicited extensions, i.e., those that were not specified as part of options.extensions. In the
# general case, the meaning of "are as expected" is specific to the Relying Party and which extensions are in use.
# 19. If the BE bit of the flags in authData is not set, verify that the BS bit is not set.
# Not using this right now.
# 20. If the credential backup state is used as part of Relying Party business logic or policy...
# Not using this right now.
# 21. Verify that the values of the client extension outputs in clientExtensionResults...
# Not using this right now.
# 16. Let hash be the result of computing a hash over response.clientDataJSON using SHA-256.
# 22. Let hash be the result of computing a hash over response.clientDataJSON using SHA-256.
client_data_hash
# 17. Using credentialPublicKey, verify that sig is a valid signature over the binary concatenation of authData and hash.
# 23. Using credentialPublicKey, verify that sig is a valid signature over the binary concatenation of authData and hash.
cose_key = COSE::Key.deserialize(Base64.decode64(security_key.public_key))
cose_algorithm = COSE::Algorithm.find(cose_key.alg)
@ -90,7 +103,13 @@ module DiscourseWebauthn
raise(PublicKeyError, I18n.t("webauthn.validation.public_key_error"))
end
# Success! Update the last used at time for the key.
# 24. If authData.signCount is nonzero or credentialRecord.signCount is nonzero...
# Not using this right now.
# 25. If response.attestationObject is present and the Relying Party wishes to verify the attestation...
# Not using this right now.
# 26. Success! Update the last used at time for the key (credentialRecord).
security_key.update(last_used: Time.zone.now)
# Return security key record so controller can use it to update the session

31
spec/lib/discourse_webauthn/authentication_service_spec.rb
View File

@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ RSpec.describe DiscourseWebauthn::AuthenticationService do
end
end
describe "authenticating a valid passkey" do
describe "authenticating passkeys" do
let(:options) do
{ factor_type: UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor], session: secure_session }
end
@ -297,10 +297,20 @@ RSpec.describe DiscourseWebauthn::AuthenticationService do
)
end
it "works and returns the correct key credential" do
key = service.authenticate_security_key
expect(key).to eq(security_key)
expect(key.factor_type).to eq(UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor])
before do
# this essentially bypasses the user handle check for this key
# a real test would need to go through the full registration/authentication flow in one go
params[:userHandle] = Base64.strict_encode64(
security_key_user.create_or_fetch_secure_identifier,
)
end
context "with a valid passkey" do
it "works and returns the correct key credential" do
key = service.authenticate_security_key
expect(key).to eq(security_key)
expect(key.factor_type).to eq(UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor])
end
end
context "when the user verification flag in the key is false" do
@ -319,5 +329,16 @@ RSpec.describe DiscourseWebauthn::AuthenticationService do
)
end
end
context "when the user handle does not match" do
it "raises an OwnershipError" do
params[:userHandle] = Base64.strict_encode64(SecureRandom.hex(20))
expect { service.authenticate_security_key }.to raise_error(
DiscourseWebauthn::OwnershipError,
I18n.t("webauthn.validation.ownership_error"),
)
end
end
end
end