We currently have some occurrences of ____FaradayFormatter for OAuth logs. This commit creates a generic formatter so that any new authenticators can use it.
What did this fix?
===============
Previously, we only triggered this event in the `user.logged_out` method.
This resulted in the event being triggered only when the user was logged
out by the administrator or the site had strict logout mode enabled.
This bug affected customers who managed user status via webhooks.
meta topic: https://meta.discourse.org/t/user-log-out-event-not-triggered-in-webhooks/249464
Previously in these 2 PRs, we introduced a new site setting `SiteSetting.enforce_second_factor_on_external_auth`.
https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/27547https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/27674
When disabled, it should enforce 2FA for local login with username and password and skip the requirement when authenticating with oauth2.
We stored information about the login method in a secure session but it is not reliable. Therefore, information about the login method is moved to the database.
AuthProvider#enabled_setting=, used primarily by plugins, has been deprecated since version 2.9, in favour of Authenticator#enabled?. This PR confirms we are seeing no more usage and removes the method.
LinkedIn has grandfathered its old OAuth2 provider. This can only be used by existing apps. New apps have to use the new OIDC provider.
This PR adds a linkedin_oidc provider to core. This will exist alongside the discourse-linkedin-auth plugin, which will be kept for those still using the deprecated provider.
This PR adds a new scheduled problem check that simply tries to connect to Twitter OAuth endpoint to check that it's working. It is using the default retry strategy of 2 retries 30 seconds apart.
This will make it easier to analyze rate limiting in reverse-proxy logs. To make this possible without a database lookup, we add the username to the encrypted `_t` cookie data.
This commit changes the default return value of `Auth::ManagedAuthenticator#primary_email_verified?` to false. We're changing the default to force developers to think about email verification when building a new authentication method. All existing authenticators (in core and official plugins) have been updated to explicitly define the `primary_email_verified?` method in their subclass of `Auth::ManagedAuthenticator` (example commit 65f57a4d05).
Internal topic: t/82084.
We're going to change the default return value of the `primary_email_verified?` method of `Auth::ManagedAuthenticator` to false, so we need to explicitly define the method on authenticators to return true where it makes sense to do so.
Internal topic: t/82084.
The previous implementation would attempt to fetch groups using the end-user's Google auth token. This only worked for admin accounts, or users with 'delegated' access to the `admin.directory.group.readonly` API.
This commit changes the approach to use a single 'service account' for fetching the groups. This removes the need to add permissions to all regular user accounts. I'll be updating the [meta docs](https://meta.discourse.org/t/226850) with instructions on setting up the service account.
This is technically a breaking change in behavior, but the existing implementation was marked experimental, and is currently unusable in production google workspace environments.
When a user with an email matching those inside the
DISCOURSE_DEVELOPER_EMAILS env var log in, we make
them into admin users if they are not already. This
is used when setting up the first admin user for
self-hosters, since the discourse-setup script sets
the provided admin emails into DISCOURSE_DEVELOPER_EMAILS.
The issue being fixed here is that the new admins were
not being automatically added to the staff and admins
automatic groups, which was causing issues with the site
settings that are group_list based that don't have an explicit
staff override. All we need to do is refresh the automatic
staff, admin groups when admin is granted for the user.
Logging out failed when the current user was cached by an instance of `Auth::DefaultCurrentUserProvider` and `#log_off_user` was called on a different instance of that class.
Co-authored-by: Sam <sam.saffron@gmail.com>
If the identity provider does not provide a precise username value, then we should use our UserNameSuggester to generate one and use it for the override. This makes the override consistent with initial account creation.
This commit introduces a new site setting: `use_name_for_username_suggestions` (default true)
Admins can disable it if they want to stop using Name values when generating usernames for users. This can be useful if you want to keep real names private-by-default or, when used in conjunction with the `use_email_for_username_and_name_suggestions` setting, you would prefer to use email-based username suggestions.
We intend to switch to the `:json` serializer, which will stringify all keys. However, we need a clean revert path. This commit ensures that our `_t` cookie handling works with both marshal (the current default) and json (the new default) serialization.
This allows authenticators to instruct the Auth::Result to override attributes without using the general site settings. This provides an easy migration path for auth plugins which offer their own "overrides email", "overrides username" or "overrides name" settings. With this new api, they can set `overrides_*` on the result object, and the attribute will be overriden regardless of the general site setting.
ManagedAuthenticator is updated to use this new API. Plugins which consume ManagedAuthenticator will instantly take advantage of this change.
OAuth2Authenticator is considered deprecated, and isn't used in core. However, some plugins still depend on it, and this was breaking the signup of previously-staged users. There is no easy way to make an end-end test of this in core, but I will be adding an integration test in the SAML plugin.
This commit introduces a new site setting "google_oauth2_hd_groups". If enabled, group information will be fetched from Google during authentication, and stored in the Discourse database. These 'associated groups' can be connected to a Discourse group via the "Membership" tab of the group preferences UI.
The majority of the implementation is generic, so we will be able to add support to more authentication methods in the near future.
https://meta.discourse.org/t/managing-group-membership-via-authentication/175950
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
This PR doesn't change any behavior, but just removes code that wasn't in use. This is a pretty dangerous place to change, since it gets called during user's registration. At the same time the refactoring is very straightforward, it's clear that this code wasn't doing any work (it still needs to be double-checked during review though). Also, the test coverage of UserNameSuggester is good.
User API keys (not the same thing as admin API keys) are currently
leaked to redis when rate limits are applied to them since redis is the
backend for rate limits in Discourse and the API keys are included in
the redis keys that are used to track usage of user API keys in the last
24 hours.
This commit stops the leak by using a SHA-256 representation of the user
API key instead of the key itself to form the redis key.
We don't need to manually delete the existing redis keys that contain
unhashed user API keys because they're not long-lived and will be
automatically deleted within 48 hours after this commit is deployed to
your Discourse instance.
When the Forever option is selected for suspending a user, the user is suspended for 1000 years. Without customizing the site’s text, this time period is displayed to the user in the suspension email that is sent to the user, and if the user attempts to log back into the site. Telling someone that they have been suspended for 1000 years seems likely to come across as a bad attempt at humour.
This PR special case messages when a user suspended or silenced forever.
If user had a staged account and logged in using a third party service
a different username was suggested. This change will try to use the
username given by the authentication provider first, then the current
staged username and last suggest a new one.
We have found when receiving and posting inbound emails to the handle_mail route, it is better to POST the payload as a base64 encoded string to avoid strange encoding issues. This introduces a new param of `email_encoded` and maintains the legacy param of email, showing a deprecation warning. Eventually the old param of `email` will be dropped and the new one `email_encoded` will be the only way to handle_mail.
Previously we were checking truthiness in some places, and `== true` in
others. That can lead to some inconsistent UX where the interface says
the email is valid, but account creation fails.
This commit ensures values are boolean when set, and raises an error for
other value types.
If this safety check is triggered, it means the specific auth provider
needs to be updated to pass booleans.
If no email is provided, email_valid should be set false, so that
Discourse can prompt the user for an email and verify it.
This fixes signups via twitter for accounts with no email address.
The 'Discourse SSO' protocol is being rebranded to DiscourseConnect. This should help to reduce confusion when 'SSO' is used in the generic sense.
This commit aims to:
- Rename `sso_` site settings. DiscourseConnect specific ones are prefixed `discourse_connect_`. Generic settings are prefixed `auth_`
- Add (server-side-only) backwards compatibility for the old setting names, with deprecation notices
- Copy `site_settings` database records to the new names
- Rename relevant translation keys
- Update relevant translations
This commit does **not** aim to:
- Rename any Ruby classes or methods. This might be done in a future commit
- Change any URLs. This would break existing integrations
- Make any changes to the protocol. This would break existing integrations
- Change any functionality. Further normalization across DiscourseConnect and other auth methods will be done separately
The risks are:
- There is no backwards compatibility for site settings on the client-side. Accessing auth-related site settings in Javascript is fairly rare, and an error on the client side would not be security-critical.
- If a plugin is monkey-patching parts of the auth process, changes to locale keys could cause broken error messages. This should also be unlikely. The old site setting names remain functional, so security-related overrides will remain working.
A follow-up commit will be made with a post-deploy migration to delete the old `site_settings` rows.
All the data we need for the `info` and `credentials` auth hash
are obtained via the user info API, not the JWT. Using and verifying
the JWT can fail due to clock skew, so let's skip it completely.
PR opened to fix the upstream issue at https://github.com/zquestz/omniauth-google-oauth2/pull/392
