Commit Graph

21 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Osama Sayegh
b86127ad12
FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).

This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).

For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.

The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.

Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.

Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.

Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.

Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-17 23:27:30 +03:00
Rafael dos Santos Silva
b301a6b3db
FEATURE: Cache CORS preflight requests for 2h (#14614)
* FEATURE: Cache CORS preflight requests for 2h

Browsers will cache this for 5 seconds by default. If using MessageBus
in a different domain, Discourse will issue a new long polling, by
default, every 30s or so. This means we would be issuing a new preflight
request **every time**. This can be incredibly wasteful, so let's cache
the authorization in the client for 2h, which is the maximum Chromium
allows us as of today.

* fix tests
2021-10-14 22:37:53 -03:00
Vinoth Kannan
72810853ea
FIX: strip the trailing slash (/) of cors origins. (#10996)
Strips trailing `/` from global settings
Provides a validation for site settings to ensure a trailing `/` is not added
2020-10-29 13:01:06 +11:00
Sam Saffron
25f1f23288
FEATURE: Stricter rules for user presence
Previously we would consider a user "present" and "last seen" if the
browser window was visible.

This has many edge cases, you could be considered present and around for
days just by having a window open and no screensaver on.

Instead we now also check that you either clicked, transitioned around app
or scrolled the page in the last minute in combination with window
visibility

This will lead to more reliable notifications via email and reduce load of
message bus for cases where a user walks away from the terminal
2020-03-26 17:36:52 +11:00
Sam Saffron
494fe335d3 DEV: allow handling crawler reqs with no user agent
Followup to e440ec25 we treat no user agent as crawler reqs.
2019-12-09 18:40:10 +11:00
Robin Ward
ddd45d1419 FIX: Broken spec 2019-09-09 15:07:40 -04:00
Sam Saffron
4ea21fa2d0 DEV: use #frozen_string_literal: true on all spec
This change both speeds up specs (less strings to allocate) and helps catch
cases where methods in Discourse are mutating inputs.

Overall we will be migrating everything to use #frozen_string_literal: true
it will take a while, but this is the first and safest move in this direction
2019-04-30 10:27:42 +10:00
Davide Porrovecchio
005e1f5373 Add Cache-Control header to CORS (#6490) 2018-10-16 10:46:55 +11:00
Sam
37c5280f73 correct spec 2018-09-17 11:37:01 +10:00
Davide Porrovecchio
1826626272 FEATURE: Add Content-Type header to CORS
- add Content-Type to Access-Control-Allow-Headers
- update test accordingly
2018-08-28 11:19:38 +10:00
Davide Porrovecchio
dd9d815178 FIX: Add User Api Key headers to CORS
- add User-Api-Key and User-Api-Client-Id to Access-Control-Allow-Headers
- update test
2018-07-24 10:28:23 +10:00
Sam
adae963751 ensure we do not override charset for content type 2018-01-25 18:43:42 +11:00
Sam
fc36f095a7 FIX: ensure proper header transfer (except for cache control)
allows discourse special headers to be visible on hijacked reqs
2018-01-21 14:26:42 +11:00
Sam
12872d03be PERF: run post timings in background
This means that if a very large amount of registered users hit
a single topic we will handle it gracefully, even if db gets slow.
2018-01-19 08:27:29 +11:00
Sam
90a55d6f7c FIX: handle CORS in hijacked requests 2017-12-07 10:31:04 +11:00
Sam
df84e1c358 Correctly track hijacked requests 2017-11-28 16:47:20 +11:00
Sam
0caa335ef0 FIX: Handle more cases where HTTP status is not correct
HTTP status was not correct with send_file which uses streaming
2017-11-28 11:00:13 +11:00
Sam
ca7af7b88f FIX: displaying wrong avatar and letter avatar
correct regression where params and env is reused in production
2017-11-28 09:28:40 +11:00
Sam
608207b2e5 FEATURE: avatar proxy happens in background
This ensures that even if it is slow to download avatars site will
continue to work

Also simplifies hijack pattern
2017-11-27 17:43:24 +11:00
Guo Xiang Tan
2e04ef97d9 Fix the build. 2017-11-27 10:53:05 +08:00
Sam
e0e99d4bbd PERF: hijack onebox requests so they do not use up a unicorn worker 2017-11-24 15:31:40 +11:00