Commit Graph

30 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Osama Sayegh
b86127ad12
FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).

This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).

For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.

The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.

Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.

Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.

Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.

Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-17 23:27:30 +03:00
Osama Sayegh
8fb823c30f
FIX: Make the verbose_auth_token_logging setting off by default (#14664)
The `generate`, `rotate` and `suspicious`  auth token logs are now always logged regardless of the `verbose_auth_token_logging` setting because we rely no these to detect suspicious logins.
2021-10-20 17:20:39 +03:00
Josh Soref
59097b207f
DEV: Correct typos and spelling mistakes (#12812)
Over the years we accrued many spelling mistakes in the code base. 

This PR attempts to fix spelling mistakes and typos in all areas of the code that are extremely safe to change 

- comments
- test descriptions
- other low risk areas
2021-05-21 11:43:47 +10:00
David Taylor
a227083c1c
FEATURE: Limit the number of active sessions for a user (#8411)
If a user has more than 60 active sessions, the oldest sessions will be terminated automatically. This protects performance when logging in and when loading the list of recently used devices.
2019-11-27 12:39:31 +00:00
Sam Saffron
b8c65cc6cf PERF: add index on user auth tokens (for user lookups)
This speeds up user destroy cause we cascade looking up all the tokens
for a user
2019-04-26 22:38:54 +10:00
Gerhard Schlager
e9ec5238fc DEV: Remove ignored columns 2019-02-08 12:12:38 +01:00
Robin Ward
95f263995d FIX: Previous annotations were broken 2019-01-11 14:30:19 -05:00
Robin Ward
a3839495e0 Update annotations 2019-01-11 12:19:43 -05:00
David Taylor
1960236822
FIX: Suspicious login detection (#6772) 2018-12-14 16:30:34 +00:00
Bianca Nenciu
fce0a0ccc8 FEATURE: Compute distance between logins to generate login alerts. (#6562) 2018-11-14 13:26:47 +01:00
Bianca Nenciu
5af9a69a3b FIX: Do not check for suspicious login when impersonating. (#6534)
* FIX: Do not check for suspicious login when impersonating.

* DEV: Add 'impersonate' parameter to log_on_user.
2018-11-12 15:34:12 +01:00
Régis Hanol
d17c8df926 Only check for suspicious login for staff members 2018-10-26 00:29:28 +02:00
Bianca Nenciu
6a3767cde7 FEATURE: Warn users via email about suspicious logins. (#6520)
* FEATURE: Warn users via email about suspicious logins.

* DEV: Move suspicious login check to a job.
2018-10-25 09:45:31 +00:00
Bianca Nenciu
931cffcebe FEATURE: Let users see their user auth tokens. (#6313) 2018-08-31 10:18:06 +02:00
Sam
5f64fd0a21 DEV: remove exec_sql and replace with mini_sql
Introduce new patterns for direct sql that are safe and fast.

MiniSql is not prone to memory bloat that can happen with direct PG usage.
It also has an extremely fast materializer and very a convenient API

- DB.exec(sql, *params) => runs sql returns row count
- DB.query(sql, *params) => runs sql returns usable objects (not a hash)
- DB.query_hash(sql, *params) => runs sql returns an array of hashes
- DB.query_single(sql, *params) => runs sql and returns a flat one dimensional array
- DB.build(sql) => returns a sql builder

See more at: https://github.com/discourse/mini_sql
2018-06-19 16:13:36 +10:00
Sam
3a06cb461e FEATURE: remove support for legacy auth tokens 2018-05-04 10:12:10 +10:00
Guo Xiang Tan
226ace1643 Update annotations. 2018-02-20 14:28:58 +08:00
Arpit Jalan
daeb7694bc update annotations 2017-12-05 21:03:20 +05:30
Sam
c68999e128 annotate models
WARNING annotators out there, be to run bin/annotate on RAILS_ENV=test on a clean db
2017-08-16 10:38:11 -04:00
Guo Xiang Tan
5012d46cbd Add rubocop to our build. (#5004) 2017-07-28 10:20:09 +09:00
Guo Xiang Tan
e8fc8f0bb6 Update annotations. 2017-03-22 14:26:53 +08:00
Sam
99f4d5082b FIX: Improve token rotation and increase logging
- avoid access denied on bad cookie, instead just nuke it
- avoid marking a token unseen for first minute post rotation
- log path in user auth token logs
2017-03-07 13:27:43 -05:00
Sam
9f8cfee450 remove dupe code, correct logging logic 2017-03-07 13:27:43 -05:00
Sam
3ac4709903 FIX: on initial token issue stop unmarking token as unseen
prev and current are the same so we need special logic to bypass
2017-02-28 10:38:22 -05:00
Sam Saffron
7e8f0dc967 FIX: attempt to handle ios edge case where token is seen but unsaved
This relaxes our security in the following way

- prev auth token is always accepted as long as rotation
date is within our window of SiteSetting.maximum_session_age.hours
(previously old token expired within a minute of new one being seen)

- new auth token is marked unseen if we are presented with an old token
after we already saw new one

This attempts to fix an issue where ios webkit is not committing new cookies
2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
Sam
2c59ffeb2c FIX: token rotation not accounting for overlapping tokens correctly
also... freeze_time has no block form, correct all usages and specs
2017-02-15 10:58:18 -05:00
Sam
5346cd3514 correct the test 2017-02-14 09:34:39 -05:00
Sam
c52784f9d2 FIX: race condition when marking tokens as seen
- in rare conditions can lead to users being logged off
2017-02-14 09:34:09 -05:00
Sam
0ab96a7691 FEATURE: add hidden setting for verbose auth token logging
This is only needed to debug auth token issues, will result in lots
of logging
2017-02-13 14:01:09 -05:00
Sam
ff49f72ad9 FEATURE: per client user tokens
Revamped system for managing authentication tokens.

- Every user has 1 token per client (web browser)
- Tokens are rotated every 10 minutes

New system migrates the old tokens to "legacy" tokens,
so users still remain logged on.

Also introduces weekly job to expire old auth tokens.
2017-02-07 09:22:16 -05:00