* DEV: Upgrade Rails to 7.1
* FIX: Remove references to `Rails.logger.chained`
`Rails.logger.chained` was provided by Logster before Rails 7.1
introduced their broadcast logger. Now all the loggers are added to
`Rails.logger.broadcasts`.
Some code in our initializers was still using `chained` instead of
`broadcasts`.
* DEV: Make parameters optional to all FakeLogger methods
* FIX: Set `override_level` on Logster loggers (#27519)
A followup to f595d599dd
* FIX: Don’t duplicate Rack response
---------
Co-authored-by: Jarek Radosz <jradosz@gmail.com>
* DEV: Upgrade Rails to 7.1
* FIX: Remove references to `Rails.logger.chained`
`Rails.logger.chained` was provided by Logster before Rails 7.1
introduced their broadcast logger. Now all the loggers are added to
`Rails.logger.broadcasts`.
Some code in our initializers was still using `chained` instead of
`broadcasts`.
* DEV: Make parameters optional to all FakeLogger methods
* FIX: Set `override_level` on Logster loggers (#27519)
A followup to f595d599dd
* FIX: Don’t duplicate Rack response
---------
Co-authored-by: Jarek Radosz <jradosz@gmail.com>
* Revert "FIX: Set `override_level` on Logster loggers (#27519)"
This reverts commit c1b0488c54.
* Revert "DEV: Make parameters optional to all FakeLogger methods"
This reverts commit 3318dad7b4.
* Revert "FIX: Remove references to `Rails.logger.chained`"
This reverts commit f595d599dd.
* Revert "DEV: Upgrade Rails to 7.1"
This reverts commit 081b00391e.
This commit fixes a problem where the user will not be able to reset
their password when they only have security keys and backup codes
configured.
This commit also makes the following changes/fixes:
1. Splits password reset system tests to
`spec/system/forgot_password_spec.rb` instead of missing the system
tests in `spec/system/login_spec.rb` which is mainly used to test
the login flow.
2. Fixes a UX issue where the `Use backup codes` or `Use authenticator
app` text is shown on the reset password form when the user does
not have either backup codes or an authenticator app configured.
This makes it more obvious what's happening, and makes it much less likely that users will send repeated reset emails (and thereby hit the rate limit)
Followup to e97ef7e9af
This commit adds the ability for site administrators to mark users'
passwords as expired. Note that this commit does not add any client side
interface to mark a user's password as expired.
The following changes are introduced in this commit:
1. Adds a `user_passwords` table and `UserPassword` model. While the
`user_passwords` table is currently used to only store expired
passwords, it will be used in the future to store a user's current
password as well.
2. Adds a `UserPasswordExpirer.expire_user_password` method which can
be used from the Rails console to mark a user's password as expired.
3. Updates `SessionsController#create` to check that the user's current
password has not been marked as expired after confirming the
password. If the password is determined to be expired based on the
existence of a `UserPassword` record with the `password_expired_at`
column set, we will not log the user in and will display a password
expired notice. A forgot password email is automatically send out to
the user as well.
Previously, if the sso= payload was invalid Base64, but signed correctly, there would be no useful log or error. This commit improves things by:
- moving the base64 check before the signature checking so that it's properly surfaced
- split the ParseError exception into PayloadParseError and SignatureError
- add user-facing errors for both of those
- add/improve spec for both
In a handful of situations, we need to verify a user's 2fa credentials before `current_user` is assigned. For example: login, email_login and change-email confirmation. This commit adds an explicit `target_user:` parameter to the centralized 2fa system so that it can be used for those situations.
For safety and clarity, this new parameter only works for anon. If some user is logged in, and target_user is set to a different user, an exception will be raised.
The most common thing that we do with fab! is:
fab!(:thing) { Fabricate(:thing) }
This commit adds a shorthand for this which is just simply:
fab!(:thing)
i.e. If you omit the block, then, by default, you'll get a `Fabricate`d object using the fabricator of the same name.
This is part 2 (of 3) for passkeys support.
This adds a hidden site setting plus routes and controller actions.
1. registering passkeys
Passkeys are registered in a two-step process. First, `create_passkey`
returns details for the browser to create a passkey. This includes
- a challenge
- the relying party ID and Origin
- the user's secure identifier
- the supported algorithms
- the user's existing passkeys (if any)
Then the browser creates a key with this information, and submits it to
the server via `register_passkey`.
2. authenticating passkeys
A similar process happens here as well. First, a challenge is created
and sent to the browser. Then the browser makes a public key credential
and submits it to the server via `passkey_auth_perform`.
3. renaming/deleting passkeys
These routes allow changing the name of a key and deleting it.
4. checking if session is trusted for sensitive actions
Since a passkey is a password replacement, we want to make sure to confirm the user's identity before allowing adding/deleting passkeys. The u/trusted-session GET route returns success if user has confirmed their session (and failed if user hasn't). In the frontend (in the next PR), we're using these routes to show the password confirmation screen.
The `/u/confirm-session` route allows the user to confirm their session with a password. The latter route's functionality already existed in core, under the 2FA flow, but it has been abstracted into its own here so it can be used independently.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
This is part 1 of 3, split up of PR #23529. This PR refactors the
webauthn code to support passkey authentication/registration.
Passkeys aren't used yet, that is coming in PRs 2 and 3.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
This commit adds support for an optional `prompt` parameter in the
payload of the /session/sso_provider endpoint. If an SSO Consumer
adds a `prompt=none` parameter to the encoded/signed `sso` payload,
then Discourse will avoid trying to login a not-logged-in user:
* If the user is already logged in, Discourse will immediately
redirect back to the Consumer with the user's credentials in a
signed payload, as usual.
* If the user is not logged in, Discourse will immediately redirect
back to the Consumer with a signed payload bearing the parameter
`failed=true`.
This allows the SSO Consumer to simply test whether or not a user is
logged in, without forcing the user to try to log in. This is useful
when the SSO Consumer allows both anonymous and authenticated access.
(E.g., users that are already logged-in to Discourse can be seamlessly
logged-in to the Consumer site, and anonymous users can remain
anonymous until they explicitly ask to log in.)
This feature is similar to the `prompt=none` functionality in an
OpenID Connect Authentication Request; see
https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest
They're both constant per-instance values, there is no need to store them
in the session. This also makes the code a bit more readable by moving
the `session_challenge_key` method up to the `DiscourseWebauthn` module.
This method is a huge footgun in production, since it calls
the Redis KEYS command. From the Redis documentation at
https://redis.io/commands/keys/:
> Warning: consider KEYS as a command that should only be used in
production environments with extreme care. It may ruin performance when
it is executed against large databases. This command is intended for
debugging and special operations, such as changing your keyspace layout.
Don't use KEYS in your regular application code.
Since we were only using `delete_prefixed` in specs (now that we
removed the usage in production in 24ec06ff85)
we can remove this and instead rely on `use_redis_snapshotting` on the
particular tests that need this kind of clearing functionality.
* FEATURE: add a setting to allowlist DiscourseConnect return path domains
This commit adds a site setting to allowlist DiscourseConnect return
path domains. The setting needs supports exact domain or wildcard
character (*) to allow for any domain as return path.
* Add more specs to clarify what is allowed in site setting
* Update setting description to explain what is allowed
This commit resolves a bug where users are not auto approved based on
`SiteSetting.auto_approve_email_domains` when
`SiteSetting.must_approve_users` has been enabled.
This security fix affects sites which have `SiteSetting.must_approve_users`
enabled. There are intentional and unintentional cases where invited
users can be auto approved and are deemed to have skipped the staff approval process.
Instead of trying to reason about when auto-approval should happen, we have decided that
enabling the `must_approve_users` setting going forward will just mean that all new users
must be explicitly approved by a staff user in the review queue. The only case where users are auto
approved is when the `auto_approve_email_domains` site setting is used.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
Previously we limited Discourse Connect provider to 1 secret per domain.
This made it pretty awkward to cycle secrets in environments where config
takes time to propagate
This change allows for the same domain to have multiple secrets
Also fixes internal implementation on DiscourseConnectProvider which was
not thread safe as it leaned on class variables to ferry data around
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: David Taylor <david@taylorhq.com>
Discourse has the Discourse Connect Provider protocol that makes it possible to
use a Discourse instance as an identity provider for external sites. As a
natural extension to this protocol, this PR adds a new feature that makes it
possible to use Discourse as a 2FA provider as well as an identity provider.
The rationale for this change is that it's very difficult to implement 2FA
support in a website and if you have multiple websites that need to have 2FA,
it's unrealistic to build and maintain a separate 2FA implementation for each
one. But with this change, you can piggyback on Discourse to take care of all
the 2FA details for you for as many sites as you wish.
To use Discourse as a 2FA provider, you'll need to follow this guide:
https://meta.discourse.org/t/-/32974. It walks you through what you need to
implement on your end/site and how to configure your Discourse instance. Once
you're done, there is only one additional thing you need to do which is to
include `require_2fa=true` in the payload that you send to Discourse.
When Discourse sees `require_2fa=true`, it'll prompt the user to confirm their
2FA using whatever methods they've enabled (TOTP or security keys), and once
they confirm they'll be redirected back to the return URL you've configured and
the payload will contain `confirmed_2fa=true`. If the user has no 2FA methods
enabled however, the payload will not contain `confirmed_2fa`, but it will
contain `no_2fa_methods=true`.
You'll need to be careful to re-run all the security checks and ensure the user
can still access the resource on your site after they return from Discourse.
This is very important because there's nothing that guarantees the user that
will come back from Discourse after they confirm 2FA is the same user that
you've redirected to Discourse.
Internal ticket: t62183.
Since we give a 200 response for login errors, we should be checking
whether the error key exists in each case or not.
Some tests were broken, because they weren't checking.
This PR adds an extra description to the 2FA page when granting a user admin access. It also introduces a general system for adding customized descriptions that can be used by future actions.
(Follow-up to dd6ec65061)
It's very easy to forget to add `require 'rails_helper'` at the top of every core/plugin spec file, and omissions can cause some very confusing/sporadic errors.
By setting this flag in `.rspec`, we can remove the need for `require 'rails_helper'` entirely.
2FA support in Discourse was added and grown gradually over the years: we first
added support for TOTP for logins, then we implemented backup codes, and last
but not least, security keys. 2FA usage was initially limited to logging in,
but it has been expanded and we now require 2FA for risky actions such as
adding a new admin to the site.
As a result of this gradual growth of the 2FA system, technical debt has
accumulated to the point where it has become difficult to require 2FA for more
actions. We now have 5 different 2FA UI implementations and each one has to
support all 3 2FA methods (TOTP, backup codes, and security keys) which makes
it difficult to maintain a consistent UX for these different implementations.
Moreover, there is a lot of repeated logic in the server-side code behind these
5 UI implementations which hinders maintainability even more.
This commit is the first step towards repaying the technical debt: it builds a
system that centralizes as much as possible of the 2FA server-side logic and
UI. The 2 main components of this system are:
1. A dedicated page for 2FA with support for all 3 methods.
2. A reusable server-side class that centralizes the 2FA logic (the
`SecondFactor::AuthManager` class).
From a top-level view, the 2FA flow in this new system looks like this:
1. User initiates an action that requires 2FA;
2. Server is aware that 2FA is required for this action, so it redirects the
user to the 2FA page if the user has a 2FA method, otherwise the action is
performed.
3. User submits the 2FA form on the page;
4. Server validates the 2FA and if it's successful, the action is performed and
the user is redirected to the previous page.
A more technically-detailed explanation/documentation of the new system is
available as a comment at the top of the `lib/second_factor/auth_manager.rb`
file. Please note that the details are not set in stone and will likely change
in the future, so please don't use the system in your plugins yet.
Since this is a new system that needs to be tested, we've decided to migrate
only the 2FA for adding a new admin to the new system at this time (in this
commit). Our plan is to gradually migrate the remaining 2FA implementations to
the new system.
For screenshots of the 2FA page, see PR #15377 on GitHub.
When staff visits the user profile of another user, the `email` field
in the model is empty. In this case, staff cannot send the reset email
password because nothing is passed in the `login` field.
This commit changes the behavior for staff users to allow resetting
password by username instead.
The UI used to request a password reset by username when the user was
logged in. This did not work when hide_email_already_taken site setting
was enabled, which disables the lookup-by-username functionality.
This commit also introduces a check to ensure that the parameter is an
email when hide_email_already_taken is enabled as the single allowed
type is email (no usernames are allowed).
* FEATURE: hide_email_address_taken forces use of email in forgot password form
This strengthens this site setting which is meant to be used to harden sites
that are experiencing abuse on forgot password routes.
Previously we would only deny letting people know if forgot password worked on not
New change also bans usage of username for forgot password when enabled
This commit adds token_hash and scopes columns to email_tokens table.
token_hash is a replacement for the token column to avoid storing email
tokens in plaintext as it can pose a security risk. The new scope column
ensures that email tokens cannot be used to perform a different action
than the one intended.
To sum up, this commit:
* Adds token_hash and scope to email_tokens
* Reuses code that schedules critical_user_email
* Refactors EmailToken.confirm and EmailToken.atomic_confirm methods
* Periodically cleans old, unconfirmed or expired email tokens
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
The previous excerpt was a simple truncated raw message. Starting with
this commit, the raw content of the draft is cooked and an excerpt is
extracted from it. The logic for extracting the excerpt mimics the the
`ExcerptParser` class, but does not implement all functionality, being
a much simpler implementation.
The two draft controllers have been merged into one and the /draft.json
route has been changed to /drafts.json to be consistent with the other
route names.
