It splits the hide_profile_and_presence user option and the default_hide_profile_and_presence site setting for more granular control. It keeps the option to hide the profile under /u/username/preferences/interface and adds the presence toggle in the quick user menu.
Co-authored-by: Régis Hanol <regis@hanol.fr>
When staff only mode is enabled - Discourse.enable_readonly_mode(Discourse::STAFF_WRITES_ONLY_MODE_KEY)
Staff members couldn't reset their password via the "forgot password" link.
This fixes it.
Internal ref. t/133990
There have been too many flaky tests as a result of leaking state in
Redis so it is easier to resolve them by ensuring we flush Redis'
database.
Locally on my machine, calling `Discourse.redis.flushdb` takes around
0.1ms which means this change will have very little impact on test
runtimes.
Follow-up to e3ae57ea7a
The previous commit added an `after_create` callback that triggers a refresh for the user directory whenever a `User` record is created. Theoretically, this approach should work, however, there's a gotcha in practice, because during a real user registration, when the `User` record is created in the database, it's not marked as active until the user verifies their email address and the user directory excludes inactive users, so the initial directory refresh triggered by the `after_create` callback becomes pointless.
To make a new user appear in the user directory immediately after sign up, we need to trigger a refresh via an `after_save` callback when they verify their email address and become active.
### What is the problem?
We have recently added a new option to add user fields required for existing users. This is in contrast to requiring fields only on sign-up.
This revealed an existing problem. Consider the following:
1. User A signs up.
2. Admin adds a new user field required on sign-up. (Should not apply to User A since they already signed up.)
3. User A tries to update their profile.
**Expected behaviour:**
No problem.
**Actual behaviour:**
User A receives an error saying they didn't fill up all required fields.
### How does this fix it?
When updating profile, we only check that required fields that are "for all users" are filled. Additionally, we check that fields that were required on sign-up and have previously been filled are not blanked out.
SiteSetting.hide_user_profiles_from_public raises a Forbidden, which disallows our after_action: add no index header from triggering.
This fix makes sure that the no index header gets added via before_action instead
We're planning to implement a feature that allows adding required fields for existing users. This PR does some preparatory refactoring to make that possible. There should be no changes to existing behaviour. Just a small update to the admin UI.
Previously, when crawlers triggered a Discourse::InvalidAccess exception, they would be served the full Ember SPA. The SPA is not optimized for crawling, and so this is likely to cause problems for sites. This issue is particularly problematic when user profiles are hidden from the public via the `hide_user_profiles_from_public` setting, because the crawler would end up being 'soft-redirected' to the homepage in the SPA.
When we send a bookmark reminder, there is an option to delete
the underlying bookmark. The Notification record stays around.
However, if you want to filter your notifications user menu
to only bookmark-based notifications, we were not showing unread
bookmark notifications for deleted bookmarks.
This commit fixes the issue _going forward_ by adding the
bookmarkable_id and bookmarkable_type to the Notification data,
so we can look up the underlying Post/Topic/Chat::Message
for a deleted bookmark and check user access in this way. Then,
it doesn't matter if the bookmark was deleted.
When making sensitive changes to an account (adding 2FA or passkeys), we
require users to confirm their password. This is to prevent an attacker
from adding 2FA to an account they have access to.
However, on newly created accounts, we should not require this, it's an
extra step and it doesn't provide extra security (since the account was
just created). This commit makes it so that we don't require session
confirmation for accounts created less than 5 minutes ago.
For performance reasons we don't automatically add fabricated users to trust level auto-groups. However, when explicitly passing a trust level to the fabricator, in 99% of cases it means that trust level is relevant for the test, and we need the groups.
This change makes it so that when a trust level is explicitly passed to the fabricator, the auto-groups are refreshed. There's no longer a need to also pass refresh_auto_groups: true, which means clearer tests, fewer mistakes, and less confusion.
We're changing the implementation of trust levels to use groups. Part of this is to have site settings that reference trust levels use groups instead. It converts the min_trust_level_to_tag_topics site setting to tag_topic_allowed_groups.
We have all these calls to Group.refresh_automatic_groups! littered throughout the tests. Including tests that are seemingly unrelated to groups. This is because automatic group memberships aren't fabricated when making a vanilla user. There are two places where you'd want to use this:
You have fabricated a user that needs a certain trust level (which is now based on group membership.)
You need the system user to have a certain trust level.
In the first case, we can pass refresh_auto_groups: true to the fabricator instead. This is a more lightweight operation that only considers a single user, instead of all users in all groups.
The second case is no longer a thing after #25400.
We're changing the implementation of trust levels to use groups. Part of this is to have site settings that reference trust levels use groups instead. It converts the min_trust_level_to_allow_invite site setting to invite_allowed_groups.
Nothing much of note. This is used in one place and there's no fallout.
This change converts the min_trust_to_create_topic site setting to
create_topic_allowed_groups.
See: https://meta.discourse.org/t/283408
- Hides the old setting
- Adds the new site setting
- Add a deprecation warning
- Updates to use the new setting
- Adds a migration to fill in the new setting if the old setting was
changed
- Adds an entry to the site_setting.keywords section
- Updates tests to account for the new change
- After a couple of months, we will remove the min_trust_to_create_topicsetting entirely.
Internal ref: /t/117248
This change converts the allow_uploaded_avatars site setting to uploaded_avatars_allowed_groups.
See: https://meta.discourse.org/t/283408
Hides the old setting
Adds the new site setting
Adds a deprecation warning
Updates to use the new setting
Adds a migration to fill in the new setting if the old setting was changed
Adds an entry to the site_setting.keywords section
Updates tests to account for the new change
After a couple of months, we will remove the allow_uploaded_avatars setting entirely.
Internal ref: /t/117248
We ask users to confirm their session if they are making a sensitive
action, such as adding/updating second factors or passkeys. This
commit adds the ability to confirm sessions with passkeys as an option
to the password confirmation.
The most common thing that we do with fab! is:
fab!(:thing) { Fabricate(:thing) }
This commit adds a shorthand for this which is just simply:
fab!(:thing)
i.e. If you omit the block, then, by default, you'll get a `Fabricate`d object using the fabricator of the same name.
There is an edge case where the following occurs:
1. The user sets a bookmark reminder on a post/topic
2. The post/topic is changed to a PM before or after the reminder
fires, and the notification remains unread by the user
3. The user opens their bookmark reminder notification list
and they can still see the notification even though they cannot
access the topic anymore
There is a very low chance for information leaking here, since
the only thing that could be exposed is the topic title if it
changes to something sensitive.
This commit filters the bookmark unread notifications by using
the bookmarkable can_see? methods and also prevents sending
reminder notifications for bookmarks the user can no longer see.
Switches to using a dialog to confirm a session (i.e. sudo mode for
account changes where we want to be extra sure the current user is who
they say they are) to match what we do with passkeys.
No plugins or themes rely on anonymous_posting_min_trust_level so we
can just switch straight over to anonymous_posting_allowed_groups
This also adds an AUTO_GROUPS const which can be imported in JS
tests which is analogous to the one defined in group.rb. This can be used
to set the current user's groups where JS tests call for checking these groups
against site settings.
Finally a AtLeastOneGroupValidator validator is added for group_list site
settings which ensures that at least one group is always selected, since if
you want to allow all users to use a feature in this way you can just use
the everyone group.
This is part 2 (of 3) for passkeys support.
This adds a hidden site setting plus routes and controller actions.
1. registering passkeys
Passkeys are registered in a two-step process. First, `create_passkey`
returns details for the browser to create a passkey. This includes
- a challenge
- the relying party ID and Origin
- the user's secure identifier
- the supported algorithms
- the user's existing passkeys (if any)
Then the browser creates a key with this information, and submits it to
the server via `register_passkey`.
2. authenticating passkeys
A similar process happens here as well. First, a challenge is created
and sent to the browser. Then the browser makes a public key credential
and submits it to the server via `passkey_auth_perform`.
3. renaming/deleting passkeys
These routes allow changing the name of a key and deleting it.
4. checking if session is trusted for sensitive actions
Since a passkey is a password replacement, we want to make sure to confirm the user's identity before allowing adding/deleting passkeys. The u/trusted-session GET route returns success if user has confirmed their session (and failed if user hasn't). In the frontend (in the next PR), we're using these routes to show the password confirmation screen.
The `/u/confirm-session` route allows the user to confirm their session with a password. The latter route's functionality already existed in core, under the 2FA flow, but it has been abstracted into its own here so it can be used independently.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
This is part 1 of 3, split up of PR #23529. This PR refactors the
webauthn code to support passkey authentication/registration.
Passkeys aren't used yet, that is coming in PRs 2 and 3.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
* FIX: Return 403 instead of redirect on username routes when hidding profiles
* Updated raised error to better reflect the problem to the user
* implemented suggested changes
Previous to this change when both `normalize_emails` and `hide_email_address_taken`
is enabled the expected `account_exists` email was only sent on exact email
matches.
This expands it so it also sends an email to the canonical email owner.
They're both constant per-instance values, there is no need to store them
in the session. This also makes the code a bit more readable by moving
the `session_challenge_key` method up to the `DiscourseWebauthn` module.
What is the problem here?
In multiple controllers, we are accepting a `limit` params but do not
impose any upper bound on the values being accepted. Without an upper
bound, we may be allowing arbituary users from generating DB queries
which may end up exhausing the resources on the server.
What is the fix here?
A new `fetch_limit_from_params` helper method is introduced in
`ApplicationController` that can be used by controller actions to safely
get the limit from the params as a default limit and maximum limit has
to be set. When an invalid limit params is encountered, the server will
respond with the 400 response code.
Context of this change:
There are two site settings which an admin can configured to set the
default categories and tags that are shown for a new user. `default_navigation_menu_categories`
is used to determine the default categories while
`default_navigation_menu_tags` is used to determine the default tags.
Prior to this change when seeding the defaults, we will filter out the
categories/tags that the user do not have permission to see. However,
this means that when the user does eventually gain permission down the
line, the default categories and tags do not appear.
What does this change do?
With this commit, we have changed it such that all the categories and tags
configured in the `default_navigation_menu_categories` and
`default_navigation_menu_tags` site settings are seeded regardless of
whether the user's visibility of the categories or tags. During
serialization, we will then filter out the categories and tags which the
user does not have visibility of.
