When sending emails out via group SMTP, if we
are sending them to non-staged users we want
to mask those emails with BCC, just so we don't
expose them to anyone we shouldn't. Staged users
are ones that have likely only interacted with
support via email, and will likely include other
people who were CC'd on the original email to the
group.
Co-authored-by: Martin Brennan <martin@discourse.org>
When sending emails out via group SMTP, if we
are sending them to non-staged users we want
to mask those emails with BCC, just so we don't
expose them to anyone we shouldn't. Staged users
are ones that have likely only interacted with
support via email, and will likely include other
people who were CC'd on the original email to the
group.
Co-authored-by: Martin Brennan <martin@discourse.org>
- Ensure it works with prefixed S3 buckets
- Perform a sanity check that all current assets are present on S3 before starting deletion
- Remove the lifecycle rule configuration and delete expired assets immediately. This task should be run post-deploy anyway, so adding a 10-day window is not required
This task is supposed to skip uploading if the asset is already present in S3. However, when a bucket 'folder path' was configured, this logic was broken and so the assets would be re-uploaded every time.
This commit fixes that logic to include the bucket 'folder path' in the check
Before this commit, there was no way for us to efficiently check an
array of topics for which a user can see. Therefore, this commit
introduces the `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` method which accepts an
array of `Topic#id`s and filters out the ids which the user is not
allowed to see. The `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` method is meant to
maintain feature parity with `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic?` at all
times so a consistency check has been added in our tests to ensure that
`TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` returns the same result as
`TopicGuardian#can_see_topic?`. In the near future, the plan is for us
to switch to `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` completely but I'm not
doing that in this commit as we have to be careful with the performance
impact of such a change.
This method is currently not being used in the current commit but will
be relied on in a subsequent commit.
Logging out failed when the current user was cached by an instance of `Auth::DefaultCurrentUserProvider` and `#log_off_user` was called on a different instance of that class.
Co-authored-by: Sam <sam.saffron@gmail.com>
This happened when a middleware accessed the `currentUser` before a controller had a chance to populate the `action_dispatch.request.path_parameters` env variable. In that case Discourse would always cache `nil` as `currentUser`.
when bundler is loaded, it sets the `RUBYOPT` environment variable to setup bundler. However, it was causing weird errors like the following when we try to install
custom plugin gems into a specific directory.
```
/home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/source/git.rb:214:in `rescue in load_spec_files': https://github.com/discourse/mail.git is not yet checked out. Run `bundle install` first. (Bundler::GitError)
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/source/git.rb:210:in `load_spec_files'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/source/path.rb:107:in `local_specs'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/source/git.rb:178:in `specs'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/lazy_specification.rb:88:in `__materialize__'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/spec_set.rb:75:in `block in materialize'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/spec_set.rb:72:in `map!'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/spec_set.rb:72:in `materialize'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/definition.rb:468:in `materialize'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/definition.rb:190:in `specs'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/definition.rb:238:in `specs_for'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/runtime.rb:18:in `setup'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler.rb:151:in `setup'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/setup.rb:20:in `block in <top (required)>'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/ui/shell.rb:136:in `with_level'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/ui/shell.rb:88:in `silence'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/gems/2.7.0/gems/bundler-2.3.5/lib/bundler/setup.rb:20:in `<top (required)>'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/site_ruby/2.7.0/rubygems/core_ext/kernel_require.rb:85:in `require'
from /home/tgxworld/.asdf/installs/ruby/2.7.5/lib/ruby/site_ruby/2.7.0/rubygems/core_ext/kernel_require.rb:85:in `require'
```
Themes often cache `nil` values in a DistributedCache. This bug meant that we were re-calculating some values on every request, AND triggering message-bus publishing on every request.
This fix should provide a significant performance improvement for busy sites.
* FEATURE: RS512, RS384 and RS256 COSE algorithms
These algorithms are not implemented by cose-ruby, but used in the web
authentication API and were marked as supported.
* FEATURE: Use all algorithms supported by cose-ruby
Previously only a subset of the algorithms were allowed.
In an earlier PR, we decided that we only want to block a domain if
the blocked domain in the SiteSetting is the final destination (/t/59305). That
PR used `FinalDestination#get`. `resolve` however is used several places
but blocks domains along the redirect chain when certain options are provided.
This commit changes the default options for `resolve` to not do that. Existing
users of `FinalDestination#resolve` are
- `Oneboxer#external_onebox`
- our onebox helper `fetch_html_doc`, which is used in amazon, standard embed
and youtube
- these folks already go through `Oneboxer#external_onebox` which already
blocks correctly
Running `update_from_remote` and `save!` cause a number of side-effects, including instructing all clients to reload CSS files. If there are no changes, then this is wasteful, and can even cause a 'flicker' effect on clients as they reload CSS.
This commit checks if any updates are available before triggering `update_from_remote` / `save!`. This should be much faster, and stop the 'flickering' UX from happening on every themes:update run.
It also improves the output of the command to include the from/to commit hashes, which may be useful for debugging issues. For example:
```
Checking 'Alien Night | A Dark Discourse Theme' for 'default'... already up to date
Checking 'Star Wars' for 'default'... updating from d8a170dd to 66b9756f
Checking 'Media Overlay' for 'default'... already up to date
```
`account_created` email contains a URL to `/u/password-reset/TOKEN`
which means that the correct scope for the email token is
`password_reset`, not `signup`.
Our previous implementation used a simple `blocked_domain_array.include?(hostname)`
so some values were not matching. Additionally, in some configurations like ours, we'd used
"cat.*.dog.com" with the assumption we'd support globbing.
This change implicitly allows globbing by blocking "http://a.b.com" if "b.com" is a blocked
domain but does not actively do anything for "*".
An upcoming change might include frontend validation for values that can be inserted.
* FIX: Mark invites flash messages as HTML safe.
This change should be safe as all user inputs included in the errors are sanitized before sending it back to the client.
Context: https://meta.discourse.org/t/html-tags-are-explicit-after-latest-update/214220
* If somebody adds a new error message that includes user input and doesn't sanitize it, using html-safe suddenly becomes unsafe again. As an extra layer of protection, we make the client sanitize the error message received from the backend.
* Escape user input instead of sanitizing
For now this is still gated behind a `QUNIT_EMBER_CLI=1` environment variable, but will eventually become the default so that we can remove `run-qunit.js`.
If the SiteSetting `allowed_onebox_iframes` contains a value of `*`, it will use the values of `all_iframe_origins` during the Oneboxing process. If `all_iframe_origins` itself contains a value of `*`, `origins_to_regexes` will try to return a "catch-all" regex.
Other code assumes `origins_to_regexes`will return an array, so this change ensures the `*` case will return an array containing only the catch-all regex.
1. `html_doc.css('.Box.md')` always returns a truthy value (e.g. `[]`) so the second branch of the if-elsif never ran
2. `node&.css('text()')` was invalid code that would raise an error
3. Matching on h3 elements is no longer correct with the current html structure returned by GitHub
