`ReviewableQueuedPost` got refactored a while back to use the more
appropriate `target_created_by` for the user of the post being queued
instead of `created_by`. The change was not extended to the `DELETE
/review/:id` endpoint leading to error responses for a user attempting
to deleting their own queued post.
This fix extends the `Reviewable` lookup implementation in
`ReviewablesController#destroy` and Guardian implementation to account
for this change.
Allow anonymous users (logged-in, but set to anonymous posting) to like posts
---------
Co-authored-by: Emmett Ling <eling@zendesk.com>
Co-authored-by: Nat <natalie.tay@discourse.org>
This PR adds the ability to destroy reviewables for a passed user via the API. This was not possible before as this action was reserved for reviewables for you created only.
If a user is an admin and calls the `#destroy` action from the API they are able to destroy a reviewable for a passed user. A user can be targeted by passed either their:
- username
- external_id (for SSO)
to the request.
In the case you attempt to destroy a non-personal reviewable and
- You are not an admin
- You do not access the `#destroy` action via the API
you will raise a `Discourse::InvalidAccess` (403) and will not succeed in destroying the reviewable.
When invoking e.g. `can_see?(Foo.new)`, the guardian checks if there's a method `#can_see_foo?` defined and if so uses that to determine whether the user can see it or not.
When such a method is not defined, the guardian currently returns `true`, but it is probably a better call (pun intended) to make it "safe by default" and return `false` instead. I.e. if you can't explicitly see it, you can't see it at all.
This change makes the change to `Guardian#can_see?` to fall back to `false` if no visibility check method is defined.
For `#can_see_user?` and `#can_see_tag?` we don't have any particular logic that prevents viewing. We previously relied on the implicit `true` value, but since that's now change to `false`, I have explicitly implemented these two methods in `UserGuardian` and `TagGuardian` modules. If in the future we want to add some logic for it, this would be the place.
To be clear, **the behaviour remains the same**, but the `true` value is now explicit rather than implicit.
The #pluck_first freedom patch, first introduced by @danielwaterworth has served us well, and is used widely throughout both core and plugins. It seems to have been a common enough use case that Rails 6 introduced it's own method #pick with the exact same implementation. This allows us to retire the freedom patch and switch over to the built-in ActiveRecord method.
There is no replacement for #pluck_first!, but a quick search shows we are using this in a very limited capacity, and in some cases incorrectly (by assuming a nil return rather than an exception), which can quite easily be replaced with #pick plus some extra handling.
Allows users to configure their own custom sidebar sections with links withing Discourse instance. Links can be passed as relative path, for example "/tags" or full URL.
Only path is saved in DB, so when Discourse domain is changed, links will be still valid.
Feature is hidden behind SiteSetting.enable_custom_sidebar_sections. This hidden setting determines the group which members have access to this new feature.
Currently, moderators are able to set primary group for users
irrespective of the of the `moderators_manage_categories_and_groups` site
setting value.
This change updates Guardian implementation to honour it.
Since the system user is a regular user, it can have its
`allow_private_messages` user option turned off, which
with our current `can_send_private_message?(Discourse.system_user)`
check inside the CurrentUserSerializer, will prevent any
user from sending messages in the UI if the system user is not
accepting PMs.
This commit adds a new `can_send_private_messages?` method to
the Guardian, which can be used in serializers and not depend
on the system user. When the user actually sends a message
we still rely on the old `can_send_private_message?(target)`
call to see if they are allowed to send the message to the target.
The new method is just to say they can "generally" send
private messages.
Before this commit, there was no way for us to efficiently check an
array of topics for which a user can see. Therefore, this commit
introduces the `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` method which accepts an
array of `Topic#id`s and filters out the ids which the user is not
allowed to see. The `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` method is meant to
maintain feature parity with `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic?` at all
times so a consistency check has been added in our tests to ensure that
`TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` returns the same result as
`TopicGuardian#can_see_topic?`. In the near future, the plan is for us
to switch to `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` completely but I'm not
doing that in this commit as we have to be careful with the performance
impact of such a change.
This method is currently not being used in the current commit but will
be relied on in a subsequent commit.
cf. e62e93f83a
This PR also makes it so `bot` (negative ID) and `system` users are always allowed
to send PMs, since the old conditional was just based on `enable_personal_messages`
This commit renames all secure_media related settings to secure_uploads_* along with the associated functionality.
This is being done because "media" does not really cover it, we aren't just doing this for images and videos etc. but for all uploads in the site.
Additionally, in future we want to secure more types of uploads, and enable a kind of "mixed mode" where some uploads are secure and some are not, so keeping media in the name is just confusing.
This also keeps compatibility with the `secure-media-uploads` path, and changes new
secure URLs to be `secure-uploads`.
Deprecated settings:
* secure_media -> secure_uploads
* secure_media_allow_embed_images_in_emails -> secure_uploads_allow_embed_images_in_emails
* secure_media_max_email_embed_image_size_kb -> secure_uploads_max_email_embed_image_size_kb
This will replace `enable_personal_messages` and
`min_trust_to_send_messages`, this commit introduces
the setting `personal_message_enabled_groups`
and uses it in all places that `enable_personal_messages`
and `min_trust_to_send_messages` currently apply.
A migration is included to set `personal_message_enabled_groups`
based on the following rules:
* If `enable_personal_messages` was false, then set
`personal_message_enabled_groups` to `3`, which is
the staff auto group
* If `min_trust_to_send_messages` is not default (1)
and the above condition is false, then set the
`personal_message_enabled_groups` setting to
the appropriate auto group based on the trust level
* Otherwise just set `personal_message_enabled_groups` to
11 which is the TL1 auto group
After follow-up PRs to plugins using these old settings, we will be
able to drop the old settings from core, in the meantime I've added
DEPRECATED notices to their descriptions and added them
to the deprecated site settings list.
This commit also introduces a `_map` shortcut method definition
for all `group_list` site settings, e.g. `SiteSetting.personal_message_enabled_groups`
also has `SiteSetting.personal_message_enabled_groups_map` available,
which automatically splits the setting by `|` and converts it into
an array of integers.
* FIX: don't memoize site setting in guardian
Memoizing site settings can make tests more fragile and harder to debug
Co-authored-by: Jarek Radosz <jradosz@gmail.com>
Before, whispers were only available for staff members.
Config has been changed to allow to configure privileged groups with access to whispers. Post migration was added to move from the old setting into the new one.
I considered having a boolean column `whisperer` on user model similar to `admin/moderator` for performance reason. Finally, I decided to keep looking for groups as queries are only done for current user and didn't notice any N+1 queries.
If a group's messageable_level is set to nobody then staff can't should not be able to send PMs to it.
Co-authored-by: Martin Brennan <martin@discourse.org>
Currently when a user creates posts that are moderated (for whatever
reason), a popup is displayed saying the post needs approval and the
total number of the user’s pending posts. But then this piece of
information is kind of lost and there is nowhere for the user to know
what are their pending posts or how many there are.
This patch solves this issue by adding a new “Pending” section to the
user’s activity page when there are some pending posts to display. When
there are none, then the “Pending” section isn’t displayed at all.
Use @here to mention all users that were allowed to topic directly or
through group, who liked topics or read the topic. Only first 10 users
will be notified.
The code that checked this permission was duplicated everytime a new
settings of this type was added. This commit changes the behavior of
some functionality because some feature checks were bypassed for staff
members.
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
Support for invites alongside DiscourseConnect was added in 355d51af. This commit fixes the guardian method so that the bulk invite button functionality also works.
* FIX: allowed_theme_ids should not be persisted in GlobalSettings
It was observed that the memoized value of `GlobalSetting.allowed_theme_ids` would be persisted across requests, which could lead to unpredictable/undesired behaviours in a multisite environment.
This change moves that logic out of GlobalSettings so that the returned theme IDs are correct for the current site.
Uses get_set_cache, which ultimately uses DistributedCache, which will take care of multisite issues for us.
`/u/username/invited.json?filter=expired` and `/u/username/invited.json?filter=pending` APIs are already returning data to admins. However, the `can_see_invite_details?` boolean was false, which prevented the Ember frontend from showing the tabs correctly. This commit updates the guardian method to match reality.
Sometimes administrators want to permanently delete posts and topics
from the database. To make sure that this is done for a good reasons,
administrators can do this only after one minute has passed since the
post was deleted or immediately if another administrator does it.
Invite is used in two contexts, when inviting a new user to the forum
and when inviting an existent user to a topic. The first case is more
complex and it involves permission checks to ensure that new users can
be created. In the second case, it is enough to ensure that the topic
is visible for both users and that all preconditions are met.
One edge case is the invite to topic via email functionality which
checks for both conditions because first the user must be invited to
create an account first and then to the topic.
A side effect of these changes is that all site settings related to
invites refer to inviting new users only now.
This commit resolves refactors can_invite_to? to use
can_invite_to_forum? for checking the site-wide permissions and then
perform topic specific checkups.
Similarly, can_invite_to? is always used with a topic object and this is
now enforced.
There was another problem before when `must_approve_users` site setting
was not checked when inviting users to forum, but was checked when
inviting to a topic.
Another minor security issue was that group owners could invite to
group topics even if they did not have the minimum trust level to do
it.
When a post is flagged with the reason of 'Something Else' a brief message can be added by the user which subsequently creates a `meta_topic` private message. The group `moderators` is automatically added to this topic.
If category group moderation is enabled, and the post belongs to a category with a reviewable group, that group should also be added to the meta_topic.
Note: This extends the `notify_moderators` logic, and will add the reviewable group to the meta_topic, regardless of the settings of that group.
This reverts a part of changes introduced by https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/13947
In that PR I:
1. Disallowed topic feature links for TL-0 users
2. Additionally, disallowed just putting any URL in topic titles for TL-0 users
Actually, we don't need the second part. It introduced unnecessary complexity for no good reason. In fact, it tries to do the job that anti-spam plugins (like Akismet plugin) should be doing.
This PR reverts this second change.
This disallows putting URLs in topic titles for TL0 users, which means that:
If a TL-0 user puts a link into the title, a topic featured link won't be generated (as if it was disabled in the site settings)
Server methods for creating and updating topics will be refusing featured links when they are called by TL-0 users
TL-0 users won't be able to put any link into the topic title. For example, the title "Hey, take a look at https://my-site.com" will be rejected.
Also, it improves a bit server behavior when creating or updating feature links on topics in the categories with disabled featured links. Before the server just silently ignored a featured link field that was passed to him, now it will be returning 422 response.
* FIX: Ensure the same email cannot be invited twice
When creating a new invite with a duplicated email, the old invite will
be updated and returned. When updating an invite with a duplicated email
address, an error will be returned.
* FIX: not Ember helper does not exist
* FIX: Sync can_invite_to_forum? and can_invite_to?
The two methods should perform the same basic set of checks, such as
check must_approve_users site setting.
Ideally, one of the methods would call the other one or be merged and
that will happen in the future.
* FIX: Show invite to group if user is group owner
This feature used to be controlled by two site settings
enable_personal_email_messages and min_trust_to_send_email_messages.
I removed enable_personal_email_messages and unhide
min_trust_to_send_email_messages to simplify the process of
enabling / disabling this feature.
This PR allows invitations to be used when the DiscourseConnect SSO is enabled for a site (`enable_discourse_connect`) and local logins are disabled. Previously invites could not be accepted with SSO enabled simply because we did not have the code paths to handle that logic.
The invitation methods that are supported include:
* Inviting people to groups via email address
* Inviting people to topics via email address
* Using invitation links generated by the Invite Users UI in the /my/invited/pending route
The flow works like this:
1. User visits an invite URL
2. The normal invitation validations (redemptions/expiry) happen at that point
3. We store the invite key in a secure session
4. The user clicks "Accept Invitation and Continue" (see below)
5. The user is redirected to /session/sso then to the SSO provider URL then back to /session/sso_login
6. We retrieve the invite based on the invite key in secure session. We revalidate the invitation. We show an error to the user if it is not valid. An additional check here for invites with an email specified is to check the SSO email matches the invite email
7. If the invite is OK we create the user via the normal SSO methods
8. We redeem the invite and activate the user. We clear the invite key in secure session.
9. If the invite had a topic we redirect the user there, otherwise we redirect to /
Note that we decided for SSO-based invites the `must_approve_users` site setting is ignored, because the invite is a form of pre-approval, and because regular non-staff users cannot send out email invites or generally invite to the forum in this case.
Also deletes some group invite checks as per https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/12353
The user interface has been reorganized to show email and link invites
in the same screen. Staff has more control over creating and updating
invites. Bulk invite has also been improved with better explanations.
On the server side, many code paths for email and link invites have
been merged to avoid duplicated logic. The API returns better responses
with more appropriate HTTP status codes.
The 'Discourse SSO' protocol is being rebranded to DiscourseConnect. This should help to reduce confusion when 'SSO' is used in the generic sense.
This commit aims to:
- Rename `sso_` site settings. DiscourseConnect specific ones are prefixed `discourse_connect_`. Generic settings are prefixed `auth_`
- Add (server-side-only) backwards compatibility for the old setting names, with deprecation notices
- Copy `site_settings` database records to the new names
- Rename relevant translation keys
- Update relevant translations
This commit does **not** aim to:
- Rename any Ruby classes or methods. This might be done in a future commit
- Change any URLs. This would break existing integrations
- Make any changes to the protocol. This would break existing integrations
- Change any functionality. Further normalization across DiscourseConnect and other auth methods will be done separately
The risks are:
- There is no backwards compatibility for site settings on the client-side. Accessing auth-related site settings in Javascript is fairly rare, and an error on the client side would not be security-critical.
- If a plugin is monkey-patching parts of the auth process, changes to locale keys could cause broken error messages. This should also be unlikely. The old site setting names remain functional, so security-related overrides will remain working.
A follow-up commit will be made with a post-deploy migration to delete the old `site_settings` rows.
A more general, lower-level change in addition to #11950.
Most code paths already check if SSO is enabled or if local logins are disabled before trying to create an email invite.
This is a safety net to ensure no invalid invites sneak by.
Also includes:
FIX: Don't allow to bulk invite when SSO is on (or when local logins are disabled)
This mirrors can_invite_to_forum? and other email invite code paths.
This adds a new min_trust_level_to_allow_ignore site setting that enables admins to control the point at which a user is allowed to ignore other users.
