Previously in these 2 PRs, we introduced a new site setting `SiteSetting.enforce_second_factor_on_external_auth`.
https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/27547https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/27674
When disabled, it should enforce 2FA for local login with username and password and skip the requirement when authenticating with oauth2.
We stored information about the login method in a secure session but it is not reliable. Therefore, information about the login method is moved to the database.
Why this change?
We have been chasing a problem with our flaky system test where the user
is logged out when it should never be.
What does this change do?
1. Logs the request path when lookup a user auth token.
2. Logs the request path and also the current thread's object id in
ActiveRecord query logs.
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
The `generate`, `rotate` and `suspicious` auth token logs are now always logged regardless of the `verbose_auth_token_logging` setting because we rely no these to detect suspicious logins.
Over the years we accrued many spelling mistakes in the code base.
This PR attempts to fix spelling mistakes and typos in all areas of the code that are extremely safe to change
- comments
- test descriptions
- other low risk areas
If a user has more than 60 active sessions, the oldest sessions will be terminated automatically. This protects performance when logging in and when loading the list of recently used devices.
Introduce new patterns for direct sql that are safe and fast.
MiniSql is not prone to memory bloat that can happen with direct PG usage.
It also has an extremely fast materializer and very a convenient API
- DB.exec(sql, *params) => runs sql returns row count
- DB.query(sql, *params) => runs sql returns usable objects (not a hash)
- DB.query_hash(sql, *params) => runs sql returns an array of hashes
- DB.query_single(sql, *params) => runs sql and returns a flat one dimensional array
- DB.build(sql) => returns a sql builder
See more at: https://github.com/discourse/mini_sql
- avoid access denied on bad cookie, instead just nuke it
- avoid marking a token unseen for first minute post rotation
- log path in user auth token logs
This relaxes our security in the following way
- prev auth token is always accepted as long as rotation
date is within our window of SiteSetting.maximum_session_age.hours
(previously old token expired within a minute of new one being seen)
- new auth token is marked unseen if we are presented with an old token
after we already saw new one
This attempts to fix an issue where ios webkit is not committing new cookies
Revamped system for managing authentication tokens.
- Every user has 1 token per client (web browser)
- Tokens are rotated every 10 minutes
New system migrates the old tokens to "legacy" tokens,
so users still remain logged on.
Also introduces weekly job to expire old auth tokens.
