This reverts commit 9694dc6cb0.
Some of our previous email styling depended on this 'incorrect' ordering, so the change caused some text to become illegible. Reverting while we work out a better solution
In order to limit issues with duplicate inline CSS definitions, this will now deduplicate inline CSS styles with the "last-to-be-defined-wins" strategy.
Also removes unecessary whitespaces in inline styles.
Context - https://meta.discourse.org/t/resolve-final-styles-in-email-notifications/310219
Co-authored-by: Thomas Kalka <thomas.kalka@gmail.com>
There are cases where a user can copy image markdown from a public
post (such as via the discourse-templates plugin) into a PM which
is then sent via an email. Since a PM is a secure context (via the
.with_secure_uploads? check on Post), the image will get a secure
URL in the PM post even though the backing upload is not secure.
This fixes the bug in that case where the image would be stripped
from the email (since it had a /secure-uploads/ URL) but not re-attached
further down the line using the secure_uploads_allow_embed_images_in_emails
setting because the upload itself was not secure.
The flow in Email::Sender for doing this is still not ideal, but
there are chicken and egg problems around when to strip the images,
how to fit in with other attachments and email size limits, and
when to apply the images inline via Email::Styles. It's convoluted,
but at least this fixes the Template use case for now.
There was an issue where if hashtag-cooked HTML was sent
to the ExcerptParser without the keep_svg option, we would
end up with empty </use> and </svg> tags on the parts of the
excerpt where the hashtag was, in this case when a post
push notification was sent.
Fixed this, and also added a way to only display a plaintext
version of the hashtag for cases like this via PrettyText#excerpt.
In some cases (e.g. user notification emails) we
are passing an excerpted/stripped version of the
post HTML to Email::Styles, at which point the
<span> elements surrounding the hashtag text have
been stripped. This caused an error when trying to
remove that element to replace the text.
Instead we can just remove all elements inside
a.hashtag-cooked and replace with the raw #hashtag
text which will work in more cases.
This commit fleshes out and adds functionality for the new `#hashtag` search and
lookup system, still hidden behind the `enable_experimental_hashtag_autocomplete`
feature flag.
**Serverside**
We have two plugin API registration methods that are used to define data sources
(`register_hashtag_data_source`) and hashtag result type priorities depending on
the context (`register_hashtag_type_in_context`). Reading the comments in plugin.rb
should make it clear what these are doing. Reading the `HashtagAutocompleteService`
in full will likely help a lot as well.
Each data source is responsible for providing its own **lookup** and **search**
method that returns hashtag results based on the arguments provided. For example,
the category hashtag data source has to take into account parent categories and
how they relate, and each data source has to define their own icon to use for the
hashtag, and so on.
The `Site` serializer has two new attributes that source data from `HashtagAutocompleteService`.
There is `hashtag_icons` that is just a simple array of all the different icons that
can be used for allowlisting in our markdown pipeline, and there is `hashtag_context_configurations`
that is used to store the type priority orders for each registered context.
When sending emails, we cannot render the SVG icons for hashtags, so
we need to change the HTML hashtags to the normal `#hashtag` text.
**Markdown**
The `hashtag-autocomplete.js` file is where I have added the new `hashtag-autocomplete`
markdown rule, and like all of our rules this is used to cook the raw text on both the clientside
and on the serverside using MiniRacer. Only on the server side do we actually reach out to
the database with the `hashtagLookup` function, on the clientside we just render a plainer
version of the hashtag HTML. Only in the composer preview do we do further lookups based
on this.
This rule is the first one (that I can find) that uses the `currentUser` based on a passed
in `user_id` for guardian checks in markdown rendering code. This is the `last_editor_id`
for both the post and chat message. In some cases we need to cook without a user present,
so the `Discourse.system_user` is used in this case.
**Chat Channels**
This also contains the changes required for chat so that chat channels can be used
as a data source for hashtag searches and lookups. This data source will only be
used when `enable_experimental_hashtag_autocomplete` is `true`, so we don't have
to worry about channel results suddenly turning up.
------
**Known Rough Edges**
- Onebox excerpts will not render the icon svg/use tags, I plan to address that in a follow up PR
- Selecting a hashtag + pressing the Quote button will result in weird behaviour, I plan to address that in a follow up PR
- Mixed hashtag contexts for hashtags without a type suffix will not work correctly, e.g. #ux which is both a category and a channel slug will resolve to a category when used inside a post or within a [chat] transcript in that post. Users can get around this manually by adding the correct suffix, for example ::channel. We may get to this at some point in future
- Icons will not show for the hashtags in emails since SVG support is so terrible in email (this is not likely to be resolved, but still noting for posterity)
- Additional refinements and review fixes wil
This commit renames all secure_media related settings to secure_uploads_* along with the associated functionality.
This is being done because "media" does not really cover it, we aren't just doing this for images and videos etc. but for all uploads in the site.
Additionally, in future we want to secure more types of uploads, and enable a kind of "mixed mode" where some uploads are secure and some are not, so keeping media in the name is just confusing.
This also keeps compatibility with the `secure-media-uploads` path, and changes new
secure URLs to be `secure-uploads`.
Deprecated settings:
* secure_media -> secure_uploads
* secure_media_allow_embed_images_in_emails -> secure_uploads_allow_embed_images_in_emails
* secure_media_max_email_embed_image_size_kb -> secure_uploads_max_email_embed_image_size_kb
This PR enables custom email dark mode styles by default that were added here.
There is currently poor support for dark mode queries in mail clients. The main beneficiary of these changes will be Apple Mail and Outlook.
Enjoy the darkness 🕶️
Inlining secure images with the same name was not possible because they
were indexed by filename. If an email contained two files with the same
name, only the first image was used for both of them. The other file
was still attached to the email.
This PR makes several changes to the group SMTP email contents to make it look more like a support inbox message.
* Remove the context posts, they only add clutter to the email and replies
* Display email addresses of staged users instead of odd generated usernames
* Add a "please reply above this line" message to sent emails
On the web, we display only an excerpt in a monospace font and the rest
of the body is hidden under ellipsis. The email displayed both of them
and it did not use the same style. This commit leaves only the excerpt
in emails and makes it use a monospace font to display it.
We had an issue where onebox thumbnail was too large and thus was optimized, and we are using the image URLs in post to redact and re-embed, based on the sha1 in the URL. Optimized image URLs have extra stuff on the end like _99x99 so we were not parsing out the sha1 correctly. Another issue I found was for posts that have giant images, the original was being used to embed in the email and thus would basically never get included because it is huge.
For example the URL 787b17ea61_2_690x335.jpeg was not parsed correctly; we would end up with 787b17ea6140f4f022eb7f1509a692f2873cfe35_2_690x335.jpeg as the sha1 which would not find the image to re-embed that was already attached to the email.
This fix will use the first optimized image of the detected upload when we are redacting and then re-embedding to make sure we are not sending giant things in email. Also, I detect if it is a onebox thumbnail or the site icon and force appropriate sizes and styles.
`max-width: 50%; max-height: 400px;` is a good fallback, however, if width and height are given and are smaller than fallback - we should persist that smaller size.
This was made adjustable to allow rolling back quickly if problems came
up. The new behaviour was made default in 93137066 and no problems with
this have been reported.
This PR introduces a few important changes to secure media redaction in emails. First of all, two new site settings have been introduced:
* `secure_media_allow_embed_images_in_emails`: If enabled we will embed secure images in emails instead of redacting them.
* `secure_media_max_email_embed_image_size_kb`: The cap to the size of the secure image we will embed, defaulting to 1mb, so the email does not become too big. Max is 10mb. Works in tandem with `email_total_attachment_size_limit_kb`.
`Email::Sender` will now attach images to the email based on these settings. The sender will also call `inline_secure_images` in `Email::Styles` after secure media is redacted and attachments are added to replace redaction messages with attached images. I went with attachment and `cid` URLs because base64 image support is _still_ flaky in email clients.
All redaction of secure media is now handled in `Email::Styles` and calls out to `PrettyText.strip_secure_media` to do the actual stripping and replacing with placeholders. `app/mailers/group_smtp_mailer.rb` and `app/mailers/user_notifications.rb` no longer do any stripping because they are earlier in the pipeline than `Email::Styles`.
Finally the redaction notice has been restyled and includes a link to the media that the user can click, which will show it to them if they have the necessary permissions.
`Nokogiri::HTML.fragment` is a huge hack (a comment in the source code
admits this). The current behavior of `Email::Styles` is to try to
emulate `fragment` using nokogumbo, but it misses some edge cases. In
particular, meta tags in a email template don't make it through to the
final email.
Instead of treating the provided HTML as an indeterminate fragment, this
commit makes `Email::Styles` treat the HTML as a complete document. This
means that the generated HTML for an email will now always contain top
level structure (a doctype, html, head and body tags).
This new behavior is behind a hidden site setting for now and defaults
off.
We have the `# frozen_string_literal: true` comment on all our
files. This means all string literals are frozen. There is no need
to call #freeze on any literals.
For files with `# frozen_string_literal: true`
```
puts %w{a b}[0].frozen?
=> true
puts "hi".frozen?
=> true
puts "a #{1} b".frozen?
=> true
puts ("a " + "b").frozen?
=> false
puts (-("a " + "b")).frozen?
=> true
```
For more details see: https://samsaffron.com/archive/2018/02/16/reducing-string-duplication-in-ruby
For example /t/ URLs were being replaced if they contained secure-media-uploads so if you made a topic called "Secure Media Uploads Are Cool" the View Topic link in the user notifications would be stripped out.
Refactored code so this secure URL detection happens in one place.
When pull_hotlinked_images tried to run on posts with secure media (which had already been downloaded from external sources) we were getting a 404 when trying to download the image because the secure endpoint doesn't allow anon downloads.
Also, we were getting into an infinite loop of pull_hotlinked_images because the job didn't consider the secure media URLs as "downloaded" already so it kept trying to download them over and over.
In this PR I have also refactored secure-media-upload URL checks and mutations into single source of truth in Upload, adding a SECURE_MEDIA_ROUTE constant to check URLs against too.
This PR introduces a new secure media setting. When enabled, it prevent unathorized access to media uploads (files of type image, video and audio). When the `login_required` setting is enabled, then all media uploads will be protected from unauthorized (anonymous) access. When `login_required`is disabled, only media in private messages will be protected from unauthorized access.
A few notes:
- the `prevent_anons_from_downloading_files` setting no longer applies to audio and video uploads
- the `secure_media` setting can only be enabled if S3 uploads are already enabled and configured
- upload records have a new column, `secure`, which is a boolean `true/false` of the upload's secure status
- when creating a public post with an upload that has already been uploaded and is marked as secure, the post creator will raise an error
- when enabling or disabling the setting on a site with existing uploads, the rake task `uploads:ensure_correct_acl` should be used to update all uploads' secure status and their ACL on S3
