When rendering the markdown code blocks we replace the
offending characters in the output string with spans highlighting a textual
representation of the character, along with a title attribute with
information about why the character was highlighted.
The list of characters stripped by this fix, which are the bidirectional
characters considered relevant, are:
U+202A
U+202B
U+202C
U+202D
U+202E
U+2066
U+2067
U+2068
U+2069
If a user posted a URL that appeared inside a Onebox, then the user
got a duplicate link notice. This was fixed by skipping those links in
Ruby.
If a user posted a URL that was Oneboxes and contained other links that
appeared in previous posts, then the user got a duplicate link notice.
This was fixed by skipping those links in JavaScript.
It was not clear that replace watched words can be used to replace text
with URLs. This introduces a new watched word type that makes it easier
to understand.
Watched words are always regular expressions, despite watched_words_
_regular_expressions being enabled or not. Internally, wildcard
characters are replaced with a regular expression that matches any non
whitespace character.
This is not a security issue because regular users are not allowed to insert FA icons anywhere in the app. Admins can insert icons via custom badges, but they do have the ability to create themes with JS.
This commit includes other various improvements to watched words.
auto_silence_first_post_regex site setting was removed because it overlapped
with 'require approval' watched words.
When embedding secure images which have been oneboxed, we checked to see if the image's parent's parent had the class onebox-body. This was not always effective as if the image does not get resized/optimized then it does not have the aspect-image div wrapping it. This would cause the image to embed in the email but be huge.
This PR changes the check to see if any of the image's ancestors have the class onebox-body, or if the image has the onebox-avatar class to account for variations in HTML structure.
We had an issue where onebox thumbnail was too large and thus was optimized, and we are using the image URLs in post to redact and re-embed, based on the sha1 in the URL. Optimized image URLs have extra stuff on the end like _99x99 so we were not parsing out the sha1 correctly. Another issue I found was for posts that have giant images, the original was being used to embed in the email and thus would basically never get included because it is huge.
For example the URL 787b17ea61_2_690x335.jpeg was not parsed correctly; we would end up with 787b17ea6140f4f022eb7f1509a692f2873cfe35_2_690x335.jpeg as the sha1 which would not find the image to re-embed that was already attached to the email.
This fix will use the first optimized image of the detected upload when we are redacting and then re-embedding to make sure we are not sending giant things in email. Also, I detect if it is a onebox thumbnail or the site icon and force appropriate sizes and styles.
`max-width: 50%; max-height: 400px;` is a good fallback, however, if width and height are given and are smaller than fallback - we should persist that smaller size.
DEV: Replace instances of Discourse.base_uri with Discourse.base_path
This is clearer because the base_uri is actually just a path prefix. This continues the work started in 555f467.
We must guarantee that "rel=noopener" was set if "target=_blank" is present, which is not always the case for trusted users. Also, if the link contains the "nofollow" attribute, it has to have the "ugc" attribute as well.
This PR introduces a few important changes to secure media redaction in emails. First of all, two new site settings have been introduced:
* `secure_media_allow_embed_images_in_emails`: If enabled we will embed secure images in emails instead of redacting them.
* `secure_media_max_email_embed_image_size_kb`: The cap to the size of the secure image we will embed, defaulting to 1mb, so the email does not become too big. Max is 10mb. Works in tandem with `email_total_attachment_size_limit_kb`.
`Email::Sender` will now attach images to the email based on these settings. The sender will also call `inline_secure_images` in `Email::Styles` after secure media is redacted and attachments are added to replace redaction messages with attached images. I went with attachment and `cid` URLs because base64 image support is _still_ flaky in email clients.
All redaction of secure media is now handled in `Email::Styles` and calls out to `PrettyText.strip_secure_media` to do the actual stripping and replacing with placeholders. `app/mailers/group_smtp_mailer.rb` and `app/mailers/user_notifications.rb` no longer do any stripping because they are earlier in the pipeline than `Email::Styles`.
Finally the redaction notice has been restyled and includes a link to the media that the user can click, which will show it to them if they have the necessary permissions.
* DEV: Move `Discourse.getURL` and related functions to a module
* DEV: Remove `Discourse.getURL` and `Discourse.getURLWithCDN`
* FIX: `get-url` is required for server side code
* DEV: Deprecate `BaseUri` too.
Prior to this change we would never clear memory from contexts and
rely on V8 reacting to pressure
This could lead to bloating of PrettyText and Transpiler contexts
This optimisations ensures that we will clear memory 2 seconds after
the last eval on the context
Co-authored-by: Mark VanLandingham <markvanlan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Robin Ward <robin.ward@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mark VanLandingham <markvanlan@gmail.com>
* Remove Handlebars.SafeString usage
* DEV: Support for `import Handlebars from 'handlebars'`;
* FIX: Sprockets was broken when `node_modules` was present
By default the old version of sprockets looks for application.js
anywhere, including in a node_modules folder if this exists
(which it will when we move to Ember CLI.)
We have the `# frozen_string_literal: true` comment on all our
files. This means all string literals are frozen. There is no need
to call #freeze on any literals.
For files with `# frozen_string_literal: true`
```
puts %w{a b}[0].frozen?
=> true
puts "hi".frozen?
=> true
puts "a #{1} b".frozen?
=> true
puts ("a " + "b").frozen?
=> false
puts (-("a " + "b")).frozen?
=> true
```
For more details see: https://samsaffron.com/archive/2018/02/16/reducing-string-duplication-in-ruby
* Remove some `.es6` from comments where it does not matter
* Use a post processor for transpilation
This will allow us to eventually use the directory structure to
transpile rather than the extension.
* FIX: Some errors and clean up in confirm-new-email
It would throw an error if the webauthn element wasn't present.
Also I changed things so that no-module is not explicitly
referenced.
* Remove `no-module`
Instead we allow a magic comment: `// discourse-skip-module` to prevent
the asset pipeline from creating a module.
* DEV: Enable babel transpilation based on directory
If it's in `app/assets/javascripts/dicourse` it will be transpiled
even without the `.es6` extension.
* REFACTOR: Remove Tilt/ES6ModuleTranspiler
If a group mention could be notified on preview it was given an `<a>`
tag with the `.notify` class. When cooked it would display differently.
This patch makes the server side cooking match the client preview.
For example /t/ URLs were being replaced if they contained secure-media-uploads so if you made a topic called "Secure Media Uploads Are Cool" the View Topic link in the user notifications would be stripped out.
Refactored code so this secure URL detection happens in one place.
When pull_hotlinked_images tried to run on posts with secure media (which had already been downloaded from external sources) we were getting a 404 when trying to download the image because the secure endpoint doesn't allow anon downloads.
Also, we were getting into an infinite loop of pull_hotlinked_images because the job didn't consider the secure media URLs as "downloaded" already so it kept trying to download them over and over.
In this PR I have also refactored secure-media-upload URL checks and mutations into single source of truth in Upload, adding a SECURE_MEDIA_ROUTE constant to check URLs against too.
This PR introduces a new secure media setting. When enabled, it prevent unathorized access to media uploads (files of type image, video and audio). When the `login_required` setting is enabled, then all media uploads will be protected from unauthorized (anonymous) access. When `login_required`is disabled, only media in private messages will be protected from unauthorized access.
A few notes:
- the `prevent_anons_from_downloading_files` setting no longer applies to audio and video uploads
- the `secure_media` setting can only be enabled if S3 uploads are already enabled and configured
- upload records have a new column, `secure`, which is a boolean `true/false` of the upload's secure status
- when creating a public post with an upload that has already been uploaded and is marked as secure, the post creator will raise an error
- when enabling or disabling the setting on a site with existing uploads, the rake task `uploads:ensure_correct_acl` should be used to update all uploads' secure status and their ACL on S3
Zeitwerk simplifies working with dependencies in dev and makes it easier reloading class chains.
We no longer need to use Rails "require_dependency" anywhere and instead can just use standard
Ruby patterns to require files.
This is a far reaching change and we expect some followups here.
- Client-side censoring fixed for non-chrome browsers. (Regular expression rewritten to avoid lookback)
- Regex generation is now done on the server, to reduce repeated logic, and make it easier to extend in plugins
- Censor tests are moved to ruby, to ensure everything works end-to-end
- If "watched words regular expressions" is enabled, warn the admin when the generated regex is invalid
