* Also fixes an issue where if webp was a downloaded hotlinked
image and then secure + sent in an email, it was not being
redacted because webp was not a supported media format in
FileHelper
* Webp originally removed as an image format in
https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/6377
and there was a spec to make sure a .bin webp
file did not get renamed from its type to webp.
However we want to support webp images now to make
sure they are properly redacted if secure media is
on, so change the example in the spec to use tiff,
another banned format, instead
* Attachments (non media files) were being marked as secure if just
SiteSetting.prevent_anons_from_downloading_files was enabled. this
was not correct as nothing should be marked as actually "secure" in
the DB without that site setting enabled
* Also add a proper standalone spec file for the upload security class
* DEV: Use Ember 3.12.2
* Add Ember version to ThemeField's DEPENDENT_CONSTANTS
* DEV: Use `id` instead of `elementId` (See: https://github.com/emberjs/ember.js/issues/18147)
* FIX: Don't leak event listeners (bug introduced in 999e2ff)
Add TopicUploadSecurityManager to handle post moves. When a post moves around or a topic changes between categories and public/private message status the uploads connected to posts in the topic need to have their secure status updated, depending on the security context the topic now lives in.
Custom emoji, profile background, and card background were being set to secure, which we do not want as they are always in a public context and result in a 403 error from the ACL if linked directly.
### General Changes and Duplication
* We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category.
* When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away.
* When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file.
* Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is).
* When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload.
### Viewing Secure Media
* The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions
* If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor`
### Removed
We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled.
* We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context.
* We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
Some specs use psql to test database restores and dropping the table after the test needs to happen outside of rspec because of transactions. The previous attempt lead to some changes to be stored in the test database.
Added a fix to gracefully error with a Webauthn::SecurityKeyError if somehow a user provides an unkown COSE algorithm when logging in with a security key.
If `COSE::Algorithm.find` returns nil we now fail gracefully and log the algorithm used along with the user ID and the security key params for debugging, as this will help us find other common algorithms to implement for webauthn
- Refactor source_url to avoid using eval in development
- Precompile handlebars in development
- Include template compilers when running qunit
- Remove unsafe-eval in development CSP
- Include unsafe-eval only for qunit routes in development
* Add timezone to user_options table
* Also migrate existing timezone values from UserCustomField,
which is where the discourse-calendar plugin is storing them
* Allow user to change their core timezone from Profile
* Auto guess & set timezone on login & invite accept & signup
* Serialize user_options.timezone for group members. this is so discourse-group-timezones can access the core user timezone, as it is being removed in discourse-calendar.
* Annotate user_option with timezone
* Validate timezone values
* Abort CensoredWordsValidator early if censored_words_regexp nil. Sometimes censored_words_regex can end up nil, erroring the validator. This handles the nil condition and also adds a spec for the validator
The secure media functionality relied on `SiteSetting.enable_s3_uploads?` which, as we found in dev, did not take into account global S3 settings via `GlobalSetting.use_s3?`. We now use `SiteSetting.Upload.enable_s3_uploads` instead to be more consistent.
Also, we now validate `enable_s3_uploads` changes, because if `GlobalSetting.use_s3?` is true users should NOT be enabling S3 uploads manually.
This PR introduces a new secure media setting. When enabled, it prevent unathorized access to media uploads (files of type image, video and audio). When the `login_required` setting is enabled, then all media uploads will be protected from unauthorized (anonymous) access. When `login_required`is disabled, only media in private messages will be protected from unauthorized access.
A few notes:
- the `prevent_anons_from_downloading_files` setting no longer applies to audio and video uploads
- the `secure_media` setting can only be enabled if S3 uploads are already enabled and configured
- upload records have a new column, `secure`, which is a boolean `true/false` of the upload's secure status
- when creating a public post with an upload that has already been uploaded and is marked as secure, the post creator will raise an error
- when enabling or disabling the setting on a site with existing uploads, the rake task `uploads:ensure_correct_acl` should be used to update all uploads' secure status and their ACL on S3
These specs are inherently fragile when they are run in a concurrent mode
in CI.
One process will create an upload, another will destroy the upload on disk
at the same time. We need a new safe mechanism here.
I was searching for a reason for randomly failing jobs_base_spec.rb. The reason was that after restorer_spec, the database is not restored to default.
After restorer spec RailsMultisite::ConnectionManagement.all_dbs is returning array of ['default', 'second']
Then base job execution is evaluated twice
```
dbs = RailsMultisite::ConnectionManagement.all_dbs
dbs.each do |db|
execute(opts)
end
```
That commit introduced a bug to the system: f69dacf979
Restore works fine for multisite, however, stopped working for non-multisite.
Reason for that was that `establish_connection` method got a check if the multisite instance is available:
```
def self.instance
@instance
end
def self.establish_connection(opts)
@instance.establish_connection(opts) if @instance
end
```
However, the reload method don't have that check
```
def self.reload
@instance = new(instance.config_filename)
end
```
To solve it, let's ensure we are in a multisite environment before call reload
It was possible to add a category to more than one default group, e.g. "default categories muted" and "default categories watching first post".
The bug was caused by category validations inadvertently comparing strings and numbers.
* FEATURE: Adds an extra protection layer when decompressing files.
* Rename exporter/importer to zip importer. Update old locale
* Added a new composite class to decompress a file with multiple strategies
* Set max file size inside a site setting
* Ensure that file is deleted after compression
* Sanitize path and files before compressing/decompressing
Zeitwerk simplifies working with dependencies in dev and makes it easier reloading class chains.
We no longer need to use Rails "require_dependency" anywhere and instead can just use standard
Ruby patterns to require files.
This is a far reaching change and we expect some followups here.
Adds 2 factor authentication method via second factor security keys over [web authn](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API).
Allows a user to authenticate a second factor on login, login-via-email, admin-login, and change password routes. Adds registration area within existing user second factor preferences to register multiple security keys. Supports both external (yubikey) and built-in (macOS/android fingerprint readers).
