mirror of
https://github.com/discourse/discourse.git
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53 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
53 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
## Discourse Security
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We take security very seriously at Discourse. We welcome any peer review of our 100% open source code to ensure nobody's Discourse forum is ever compromised or hacked.
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### Where should I report security issues?
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In order to give the community time to respond and upgrade we strongly urge you report all security issues privately. Please email us at `team@discourse.org` with details and we will respond ASAP. Security issues *always* take precedence over bug fixes and feature work. We can and do mark releases as "urgent" if they contain serious security fixes.
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### Password Storage
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Discourse uses the PBKDF2 algorithm to encrypt salted passwords. This algorithm is blessed by NIST. Security experts on the web [tend to agree that PBKDF2 is a secure choice](http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-security-experts-recommend-bcrypt-for-password-storage).
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**options you can customise in your production.rb file**
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- `pbkdf2_algorithm`: the hashing algorithm used (default "sha256")
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- `pbkdf2_iterations`: the number of iterations to run (default 64000)
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### XSS
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The main vector for [XSS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting) attacks is via the post composer, as we allow users to enter Markdown, HTML (a safe subset thereof), and BBCode to format posts.
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There are 2 main scenarios we protect against:
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1. **Markdown preview invokes an XSS.** This is possibly severe in one specific case: when a forum staff member edits a user's post, seeing the raw markup, where a malicious user may have inserted code to run JavaScript. This code would only show up in the preview, but it would run in the context of a forum staff member, which is *very* bad.
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2. **Markdown displayed on the page invokes an XSS.** To protect against client side preview XSS, Discourse uses [Google Caja](https://developers.google.com/caja/) in the preview window.
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On the server side we run a whitelist based sanitizer, implemented using the [Sanitize gem](https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize). See the [relevant Discourse code](https://github.com/discourse/discourse/blob/master/lib/pretty_text.rb).
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In addition, titles and all other places where non-admins can enter code are protected either using the Handlebars library or standard Rails XSS protection.
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### CSRF
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[CSRF](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery) allows malicious sites to perform HTTP requests in the context of a forum user without their knowledge -- mostly by getting users who already hold a valid forum login cookie to click a specific link in their web browser.
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Discourse extends the built-in Rails CSRF protection in the following ways:
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1. By default any non GET requests ALWAYS require a valid CSRF token. If a CSRF token is missing Discourse will raise an exception.
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2. API calls using the secret API bypass CSRF checks.
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3. Certain pages are "cachable", we do not render the CSRF token (`<meta name='csrf-token' ...`) on any cachable pages. Instead when users are about to perform the first non GET request they retrieve the token just in time via `GET session/csrf`
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### DDOS
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If you install via our recommended Docker image in our [install guide][ig], nginx is the front end web server. For additional DDOS protection we recommend placing [HAProxy](http://haproxy.1wt.eu/) in front.
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### Deployment concerns
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We strongly recommend that the various Discourse processes (web server, sidekiq) run under a non-elevated account. This is handled automatically if you install via our recommended Docker image -- see [our install guide][ig] for details.
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[ig]: https://github.com/discourse/discourse/blob/master/docs/INSTALL.md
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