This commit adds some protections in InviteRedeemer to ensure that email
can never be nil, which could cause issues with inviting the invited
person to private topics since there was an incorrect inner join.
If the email is nil and the invite is scoped to an email, we just use
that invite.email unconditionally. If a redeeming_user (an existing
user) is passed in when redeeming an email, we use their email to
override the passed in email. Otherwise we just use the passed in
email. We now raise an error after all this if the email is still nil.
This commit also adds some tests to catch the private topic fix, and
some general improvements and comments around the invite code.
This commit also includes a migration to delete TopicAllowedUser records
for users who were mistakenly added to topics as part of the invite
redemption process.
Before this commit, we did not have guardian checks in place to determine if a
topic's title associated with a user badge should be displayed or not.
This means that the topic title of topics with restricted access
could be leaked to anon and users without access if certain conditions
are met. While we will not specify the conditions required, we have internally
assessed that the odds of meeting such conditions are low.
With this commit, we will now apply a guardian check to ensure that the
current user is able to see a topic before the topic's title is included
in the serialized object of a `UserBadge`.
Before this commit, there was no way for us to efficiently check an
array of topics for which a user can see. Therefore, this commit
introduces the `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` method which accepts an
array of `Topic#id`s and filters out the ids which the user is not
allowed to see. The `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` method is meant to
maintain feature parity with `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic?` at all
times so a consistency check has been added in our tests to ensure that
`TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` returns the same result as
`TopicGuardian#can_see_topic?`. In the near future, the plan is for us
to switch to `TopicGuardian#can_see_topic_ids` completely but I'm not
doing that in this commit as we have to be careful with the performance
impact of such a change.
This method is currently not being used in the current commit but will
be relied on in a subsequent commit.
Building does not persist the object in the database which is
unrealistic since we're mostly dealing with persisted objects in
production.
In theory, this will result our test suite taking longer to run since we
now have to write to the database. However, I don't expect the increase
to be significant and it is actually no different than us adding new
tests which fabricates more objects.
* SECURITY: moderator shouldn't be able to import a theme via API.
* DEV: apply `AdminConstraint` for all the "themes" routes.
Co-authored-by: Vinoth Kannan <svkn.87@gmail.com>
Logging out failed when the current user was cached by an instance of `Auth::DefaultCurrentUserProvider` and `#log_off_user` was called on a different instance of that class.
Co-authored-by: Sam <sam.saffron@gmail.com>
This happened when a middleware accessed the `currentUser` before a controller had a chance to populate the `action_dispatch.request.path_parameters` env variable. In that case Discourse would always cache `nil` as `currentUser`.
In certain situations, a logged in user can redeem an invite with an email that
either doesn't match the invite's email or does not adhere to the email domain
restriction of an invite link. The impact of this flaw is aggrevated
when the invite has been configured to add the user that accepts the
invite into restricted groups.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
When a site has `SiteSetting.invite_only` enabled, we create a
`ReviewableUser`record when activating a user if the user is not
approved. Therefore, we need to approve the user when redeeming an
invite.
There are some uncertainties surrounding why a `ReviewableRecord` is
created for a user in an invites only site but this commit does not seek
to address that.
Follow-up to 7c4e2d33fa
This security fix affects sites which have `SiteSetting.must_approve_users`
enabled. There are intentional and unintentional cases where invited
users can be auto approved and are deemed to have skipped the staff approval process.
Instead of trying to reason about when auto-approval should happen, we have decided that
enabling the `must_approve_users` setting going forward will just mean that all new users
must be explicitly approved by a staff user in the review queue. The only case where users are auto
approved is when the `auto_approve_email_domains` site setting is used.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
After this commit, category group permissions can only be seen by users
that are allowed to manage a category. In the past, we inadvertently
included a category's group permissions settings in `CategoriesController#show`
and `CategoriesController#find_by_slug` endpoints for normal users when
those settings are only a concern to users that can manage a category.
The permissions for the 'everyone' group were not serialized because
the list of groups a user can view did not include it. This bug was
introduced in commit dfaf9831f7.
Our group fabrication creates groups with name "my_group_#{n}" where n
is the sequence number of the group being created. However, this can
cause the test to be flaky if and when a group with name `my_group_10`
is created as it will be ordered before
`my_group_9`. This commits makes the group names determinstic to
eliminate any flakiness.
This reverts commit 558bc6b746.
In certain instances when viewing a category, the name of a group with
restricted visilbity may be revealed to users which do not have the
required permission.
Themes often cache `nil` values in a DistributedCache. This bug meant that we were re-calculating some values on every request, AND triggering message-bus publishing on every request.
This fix should provide a significant performance improvement for busy sites.
* FEATURE: RS512, RS384 and RS256 COSE algorithms
These algorithms are not implemented by cose-ruby, but used in the web
authentication API and were marked as supported.
* FEATURE: Use all algorithms supported by cose-ruby
Previously only a subset of the algorithms were allowed.
In an earlier PR, we decided that we only want to block a domain if
the blocked domain in the SiteSetting is the final destination (/t/59305). That
PR used `FinalDestination#get`. `resolve` however is used several places
but blocks domains along the redirect chain when certain options are provided.
This commit changes the default options for `resolve` to not do that. Existing
users of `FinalDestination#resolve` are
- `Oneboxer#external_onebox`
- our onebox helper `fetch_html_doc`, which is used in amazon, standard embed
and youtube
- these folks already go through `Oneboxer#external_onebox` which already
blocks correctly
When staff visits the user profile of another user, the `email` field
in the model is empty. In this case, staff cannot send the reset email
password because nothing is passed in the `login` field.
This commit changes the behavior for staff users to allow resetting
password by username instead.
This commit fixes a bug where we our `HTMLScrubber` was only searching
for emoji img tags which contains only the "emoji" class. However, our emoji image tags
may contain more than just the "emoji" class like "only-emoji" when an
emoji exists by itself on a single line.
If a model class calls preload_custom_fields twice then
we have to clear this otherwise the fields are cached inside the
already existing proxy and no new ones are added, so when we check
for custom_fields[KEY] an error is likely to occur
In the unlikely, but possible, scenario where a user has no email_tokens, and has an invite record for their email address, login would fail. This commit fixes the `Invite` `user_doesnt_already_exist` validation so that it only applies to new invites, or when changing the email address.
This regressed in d8fe0f4199 (based on `git bisect`)
The UI used to request a password reset by username when the user was
logged in. This did not work when hide_email_already_taken site setting
was enabled, which disables the lookup-by-username functionality.
This commit also introduces a check to ensure that the parameter is an
email when hide_email_already_taken is enabled as the single allowed
type is email (no usernames are allowed).
Our previous implementation used a simple `blocked_domain_array.include?(hostname)`
so some values were not matching. Additionally, in some configurations like ours, we'd used
"cat.*.dog.com" with the assumption we'd support globbing.
This change implicitly allows globbing by blocking "http://a.b.com" if "b.com" is a blocked
domain but does not actively do anything for "*".
An upcoming change might include frontend validation for values that can be inserted.
* FIX: Tag watching for everyone tag groups
Tags in tag groups that have permissions set to everyone were not able
to be saved correctly. A user on their preferences page would mark the
tags that they wanted to save, but the watched_tags in the response
would be empty. This did not apply to admins, just regular users. Even
though the watched tags were being saved in the db, the user serializer
response was filtering them out. When a user refreshed their preferences
pages it would show zero watched tags.
This appears to be a regression introduced by:
0f598ca51e
The issue that needed to be fixed is that we don't track the "everyone"
group (which has an id of 0) in the group_users table. This is because
everyone has access to it, so why fill a row for every single user, that
would be a lot. The fix was to update the query to include tag groups
that had permissions set to the "everyone" group (group_id 0).
I also added another check to the existing spec for updating
watched tags for tags that aren't in a tag group so that it checks the
response body. I then added a new spec which updates watched tags for
tags in a tag group which has permissions set to everyone.
* Resolve failing tests
Improve SQL query syntax for including the "everyone" group with the id
of 0.
This commit also fixes a few failing tests that were introduced. It
turns out that the Fabrication of the Tag Group Permissions was faulty.
What happens when creating the tag groups without any permissions is
that it sets the permission to "everyone". If we then follow up with
fabricating a tag group permission on the tag group instead of having a
single permission it will have 2 (everyone + the group specified)! We
don't want this. To fix it I removed the fabrication of tag group
permissions and just set the permissions directly when creating the tag
group.
* Use response.parsed_body instead of JSON.parse
* FIX: Mark invites flash messages as HTML safe.
This change should be safe as all user inputs included in the errors are sanitized before sending it back to the client.
Context: https://meta.discourse.org/t/html-tags-are-explicit-after-latest-update/214220
* If somebody adds a new error message that includes user input and doesn't sanitize it, using html-safe suddenly becomes unsafe again. As an extra layer of protection, we make the client sanitize the error message received from the backend.
* Escape user input instead of sanitizing
* FEATURE: Export topics to markdown
The route `/raw/TOPIC_ID` will now export whole topics (paginated to 100
posts) in a markdown format.
See https://meta.discourse.org/t/-/152185/12
If the SiteSetting `allowed_onebox_iframes` contains a value of `*`, it will use the values of `all_iframe_origins` during the Oneboxing process. If `all_iframe_origins` itself contains a value of `*`, `origins_to_regexes` will try to return a "catch-all" regex.
Other code assumes `origins_to_regexes`will return an array, so this change ensures the `*` case will return an array containing only the catch-all regex.
1. `html_doc.css('.Box.md')` always returns a truthy value (e.g. `[]`) so the second branch of the if-elsif never ran
2. `node&.css('text()')` was invalid code that would raise an error
3. Matching on h3 elements is no longer correct with the current html structure returned by GitHub
